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1.0 Chapter One – Introduction 
 
1.1 Background and Introduction 
 
Michael Blakeney describes counterfeits as “goods, manufactured, distributed and sold as 
copies of goods which have been made without the authority of the owner of the intellectual 
property.”1 These goods – he notes - are intended to appear so similar to the original, so as to 
be passed off as genuine items. According to Ben Sihanya counterfeiting is the use of 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) without authority to produce similar or substantially identical 
product to legitimate products.2 This often includes use of famous brand-names, on 
pharmaceutical products (pharma-products) not manufactured by or on behalf of the owner of 
the trade mark, as well as exact copies which are traded in a form intended to be 
indistinguishable from the genuine pharma-product. He argues that counterfeiting connotes 
wilful infringement of IPRs and involves elements of fraud, forgery and deception variously 
consumers and legitimate traders reposing counterfeiting within realm of criminal law.3 
 
Blakeney’s definition makes it imperative to demystify the term Intellectual Property Rights 
as a preliminary in this study. It also constrains an exposition of what constitutes an Intellectual 
Property (IP) system and the entitlements conferred upon an IPR owner. Significantly, 
Blakeney’s and Sihanya’s definition appears to circumscribe ’counterfeit-ability’ to defined 
IPR relating to ‘product-identification’. 
 
Harvard Law’s William Fisher conceives IPRs as “a loose cluster of legal doctrines that 
regulate the uses of different sorts of ideas and insignia. The law of copyright protects various 
‘original forms of expression,’ including novels, movies, musical compositions, and computer 
software programs. Patent law protects inventions and some kinds of discoveries. Trademark 
law protects words and symbols that identify for consumers the goods and services 
manufactured or supplied by particular persons or firms. Trade-secret law protects 
commercially valuable information (soft-drink formulas, confidential marketing strategies etc) 
that companies attempt to conceal from their competitors. The “right of publicity” protects 
celebrities’ interests in their images and identities.”4 From Fisher’s definition it is apparent that 
within the various classes of IPRs, it is Trademark and copyright law that best co-hear with 
Blakeney’s and Sihanya’s conceptualisation of counterfeits-proper. 
 
The definition of IPRs by Fisher importantly elicits the numerous taxonomies of IPRs, within 
the larger understanding of the heterogeneous body of rights, collectively defined as, IPRs. 
These body of rights create defined exclusive legal entitlements (in the nature of proprietary 
                                                          
1Blakeney M, ‘Counterfeiting and Piracy: An Overview’ in International Chamber of Commerce, Counter-
Intelligence Bureau, The International Anti-Counterfeiting Directory, 2005, 9. 
2Sihanya B, Intellectual Property and Innovation Law in Kenya and Africa, Transferring Technology for 
Development, Sihanya Mentoring & Innovative Lawyering, Nairobi, 2016, 455. 
3Sihanya B, Intellectual Property and Innovation Law in Kenya and Africa, 492. 
4 Fisher W, Theories of Intellectual Property, http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/tfisher/iptheory.html. 
8 
 
rights) to the particular creation, expression, innovation or invention. The IPRs subsist under 
an IP regime comprising of an inter-linked tri-limb, first creation (which includes termination 
and effluxion of rights); secondly exploitation (which includes administration, management 
and commercialisation of rights); and lastly, enforcement (civil and criminal) of the IPRs. This 
study addresses itself to the last of these three (3) limbs, i.e. what is the effectiveness of Kenya’s 
anti-counterfeiting legal system; and the effect thereof on growth of Kenya’s pharma-industry. 
 
IPRs and the wholesome IP regime are undoubtedly of great significance in economic 
advancement, the world over and especially in developing economies like Kenya. Sihanya 
highlights that most developing nations ironically do not regard IP enforcement as a key 
strategic issue for sustainable development; vis-à-vis issues such as health, security, 
employment and wealth creation whereas effective IP enforcement is actually a key enabler for 
attaining this other prioritised goals.5 Regrettably, these developing economies have failed to 
expend sufficiently responsive effort, to efficiently enforce IPRs, this despite the gravity of the 
negative impact of the proliferation of counterfeits. A statement by Ron Noble the Secretary 
General of Interpol aptly captures the gave state of affairs thus, “What I find absolutely amazing 
is that this is a multi-billion dollar problem that affects the safety of people, the security of 
governments, that is connected to organised crime drug trafficking and terrorism, and no one 
pressures me to say what I’m doing about this problem. There is no pressure to produce results.6  
 
Specifically, according to data from the “World Health Organization (WHO), and the World 
Customs Organization (WCO); counterfeit medicines are on the rise, and cost the EU 
pharmaceutical industry €10.2 billion (US $12.4 billion) a year in lost sales, according to a 
European Union Intellectual Property Office report with an increased use of e-commerce by 
the counterfeiters coupled with the difficulty of tracing the source of those selling via these 
platforms.”7 Counterfeiting is clearly a multi-billion dollar problem compounded unabated, 
with the growth of e-commerce and the online market place. 
 
Kenya is a comparatively advanced African economy,8 recently adjudged as having the 3 
largest economy in sub-sahara Africa.9 hitherto having tourism at the core of its economy, but 
in the recent past, multinationals have been gravitating en masse to Kenya, relocating their 
African headquarters to Kenya.10 Arguably the attraction is due to an increased diversification 
of investment opportunities and robust growth prospects anchored in a contentiously enabling 
                                                          
5Sihanya B, Intellectual Property and Innovation Law in Kenya and Africa, 660. 
6 Lowe P, ‘Continuing the fight against fakes’ in International Chamber of Commerce, Counter-Intelligence 
Bureau The International Anti-Counterfeiting Directory, 2005, 5.  
4.Vepachedu R, ‘COUNTERFEIT MEDICINES - Code Red now to RACE’ published on May, 19 2018 
athttps://www.linkedin.com/pulse/counterfeit-medicines-rao-vepachedu-jd-phd-llm/   
8Kenya: Grounding Africa’s Economic Growth, October 2016 Deloitte, accessed at  
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/za/Documents/africa/za_Kenya_Report_Formatted.pdf  




10 Mwangi W, ‘Big Pharma’s healthy contribution’, Daily Nation, November 9, 2018, 18.   
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legal environment.11 To tap into this economic-promise, Kenya’s President resolved to 
prioritise four key areas, meant to accelerate his administration’s development agenda for the 
country. These are, the provision of affordable housing; Universal healthcare, Food security, 
Industrialisation, manufacturing and agro-processing.  
 
The Country has also been on an economic-charm-offensive to attract foreign direct investment 
(FDI) including the Volkswagen12 and Peugeot manufacturing plants as well as the world’s top 
ten pharma companies all setting up offices directly or through representative offices in 
Kenya.13 Further, the local establishment and launch of BBC’s largest bureau outside the UK 
also evinces the increased attractiveness of Kenya as an investment destination.14 Patently, a 
robust pharma- industry is thus necessary to realise the country’s development aspiration. 
 
Notably thereto, in advancing an enabling local trade environment, Kenya is amongst the first 
signatories of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS),15 
having contracted the same on 1st January, 1995.16 Significantly, Part III thereof obligates the 
member states to enforce Intellectual Property Rights, in a manner that facilitates growth of 
trade.17 Therefore in pursuing its growth agenda, due regard must be borne to the obligations 
accruing under TRIPs. 
 
Globally, the International Chamber of Commerce’s Counter-Intelligence Bureau (ICC-CIB) 
published a report,18 demonstrating counterfeit’s dire effects on various manufacturing sub-
sectors, vis-à-vis the contemporaneous luxurious outcome for counterfeiters. This nexus 
between licit businesses’ returns and IPR enforcement has obvious consequences on tax 
collection, unemployment levels,19 a country’s appeal as a business innovation hub and 
ultimately its ability to develop socio-economically.  
 
IP has increasingly become a key feature of international and regional trade agreements. With 
globalisation and rise in electronic commerce, there is a contemporaneous rise in counterfeits. 
Pharmaceutical products are a key target.20 Kenya cannot successfully pursue its ambitious 
development agenda and attract FDI, without a responsive enforcement regime against 
                                                          
11Deloitte, Kenya: Grounding Africa’s Economic Growth, October 2016, 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/za/Documents/africa/za_Kenya_Report_Formatted.pdf.  
12Presidential Strategic Communication Unit, ‘VW to double locally produced cars, explores second model’ 
Business Daily, Friday12 January, 2018.  
 https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/corporate/companies/VW-to-double-car-production-in-
Kenya/4003102-4261866-cl1srp/index.html. 
13Mwangi W, “Big Pharma’s healthy contribution”, 18.   
14Establishment and launch of BBC’s largest bureau outside the UK https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
46096218  
15Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS Agreement) 1st January, 1995. 
16http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/other_treaties/parties.jsp?treaty_id=231&group_id=22.  
17Article 41, TRIPS Agreement. 
18International Chamber of Commerce Counterfeiting Intelligence Bureau(ICC-CIB), ‘Getting a feel of the size of 
the problem’ International Anti-counterfeiting Directory, 2005, 2. 
19ICC-CIB, ‘Getting a feel of the size of the problem’, 11. 
20Sihanya B, Intellectual Property and Innovation Law in Kenya and Africa, 456. 
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counterfeits. A publication by Nayanah Siva, captures the dangers lurking in a permissive 
environment, allowing proliferation of counterfeit medication to consumers.21 He considers the 
twin outcomes of availing right to health and protecting the IPR holders’ rights; and notes that 
there is urgent need to decisively crack down on counterfeits, not just to safeguard the interests 
and investments of the pharmaceutical manufacturers but also to protect the lives of many 
innocent purchasers of the counterfeit medication. 
 
In a study of counterfeiting’s demand side, Blosh, Bush and Campbell write about Consumer 
accomplices in product counterfeiting, and note that not all consumers/purchasers of 
counterfeit products are ‘innocent’. They urge that some knowingly purchase that which is 
counterfeit often due to the cost element, but also at times due to wider distribution of the 
counterfeits as opposed to the genuine products. Their study highlights the challenge posed 
against anti-counterfeiting from the comparative affordability, convenience and accessibility 
and availability of the counterfeits.22 Blakeney equally addresses the consumer accomplice 
phenomena by observing that counterfeiting would actually be non-existent without the 
consumer demand for the counterfeits; and, the misconception of counterfeiting as innocuous 
infractions.23 These views establish that effective enforcement will not singularly be targeted 
at the counterfeiters, but also meaningful enlightenment of consumers against counterfeits. 
 
 1.2 Problem Statement 
 
The effective enforcement of IPRs is intended to help maximise economic benefits accruing to 
commercial and industrial activity through fair competition on one part and safeguard 
consumer welfare of the other. IP, in and of itself, has become an integral part of economic and 
socio-cultural development globally: especially with the entrenchment of the globally-
interlinked national, regional and international IP systems. It is therefore peremptory to adopt 
innovative, and symbiotic cross-border, approaches to match the challenges faced.24  
 
It is undoubtedly true that Kenya’s economy has been facing sluggish growth particularly in 
the country’s manufacturing industry – accounting for a meagre 9% of the Country’s Gross 
Domestic Product. Curiously, despite the marginal growth it is also true that Kenya is amongst 
the fastest growing economies globally, with a macro-economic growth of between 5% and 
10%.25 The current President’s ambitious ‘Big Four Agenda’ evinces the need for measures 
that will build-on the gains and actualise industrialisation, manufacturing and agro-processing 
(of the one part) as key focus areas in raising the sector’s share from 9% to 15% of Kenya’s 
GDP within five years.26 This development agenda equally requires funding, which revenue 
                                                          
21 Siva N, ‘Tackling the booming trade in Counterfeit Drugs’ 376 The Lancet, 2010, 1725-1726. 
22Bloch P, Bush R, Campbell L, "Consumer “accomplices” in product counterfeiting: a demand side investigation", 
10 (4) Journal of Consumer Marketing, 1993, 27-36.  
 https://doi.org/10.1108/07363769310047374.  
23Blakeney M, Counterfeiting and Piracy: An Overview’, 9. 
24 World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), Intellectual Property Handbook, 2nd ed, WIPO, 2004, 163. 
25 Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA), 2016-2017 COMESA Biennial Report. 
26 Lang’at P, ‘How Uhuru hopes to achieve Big Four agenda’ Daily Nation, 24 January, 2018, 4. 
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(for government) is lost with a contraction of legitimate trade at the expense of illicit trade.27 
Therefore how best to secure the Pharma-industry’s growth (being a key sub-set of the 
manufacturing sector) is an issue of great concern. 
 
The current Jubilee administration projects quality livelihoods, massive job creation and 
attracting FDI as key outcomes of actualising its campaign manifesto. This it projects to 
achieve through establishment of manufacturing and processing of leather, manufacturing and 
processing of cotton, agro-processing and ultimately export leather, and textile products worth 
KES 7 and KES 20 Billion respectively and creation of jobs within these sectors.28 The Pharma-
industry if properly safeguarded, will facilitate and compliment the actualisation of the 
projected key outcomes.29 Investors are less likely to venture into markets where counterfeits 
are rampant. 
 
These ambitious development initiatives, seeking to position the country as a major economic 
player, and the obligations accruing from contracting TRIPS, necessitate an examination of the 
interface between the tri-limb of an effective IP system ranging from creation of IPRs, their 
lawful exploitation finally through to enforcement. The proper address of this tri-limb, will 
enable aggressive pursuit of industrial growth, economic development, acquisition and 
enhancement of technological capability, trade and competition.30 The Kenyan government, 
Kenya Association of Manufacturers (KAM) and the Anti-counterfeit Authority (ACA) 
reckon, that for the economy to grow their must be concerted effort against the counterfeit 
trade, this as protection of IPRs plays a crucial role in fostering economic development.31 
WIPO observes that, state authorities have to actively play their role, and that civil remedies 
(singularly/exclusively) are not always sufficient deterrents32 as the infringers are able to set-
up elsewhere. IP owners should be able to call on state authorities to deal with counterfeits.33  
 
Further most consumers rely on the label, brand names and packaging when purchasing and 
pay less attention to the product itself.34 This is informed by consumer’s association of certain 
brands, with quality and medicinal potency for the genuine product. However, this 
recognisability, as well goodwill, is regrettably exploited by counterfeiters. Sihanya observes 
that most pharma-counterfeiters purchase generics and market them through counterfeit 
packaging, which are widely marketed and sold in many African Pharmacies, supermarkets, 
shops, bus-stations, catering establishments including through door-to-door sales.  
 
                                                          
27Sihanya B, Intellectual Property and Innovation Law in Kenya and Africa, 468. 
28Kenyan Government Draft 2017/2018 draft policy statement cited in Daily Nation, 24 January, 2018, 4, “How 
Uhuru hopes to achieve Big Four agenda”.  
29Mwangi W, ‘Big Pharma’s healthy contribution’, 18.   
30Sikoyo G, Nyukuri E, and Wakhungu J, ‘Intellectual Property Protection in Africa: Status of Laws, Research and 
Policy Analysis in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa and Uganda,’ African Centre for Technology Studies, 2006.  
31Anti-Counterfeit Agency calls for closer ties to fight vice, Business Today, 30 November 2017 
https://businesstoday.co.ke/anti-counterfeits-agency-calls-closer-ties-fight-vice/ on 13 January, 2018.  
32WIPO, Intellectual Property Handbook , 215.  
33WIPO, Intellectual Property Handbook, 207. 
34Sihanya B, Intellectual Property and Innovation Law in Kenya and Africa, 458. 
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According to the WHO, 30% of all medicine marketed and sold in Africa is counterfeit.35 The 
ICC-CIB report highlights the magnitude of the problem in various sectors including the 
pharma-industry where it notes that: “It is estimated that counterfeit pharmaceuticals account 
for up to 10% of the global market – United States Food and Drug Administration.”36 Sihanya 
in discussing the size of the problem observes that 7% of the global pharma products is 
counterfeit, 60% of which is in African countries.37 The internet and related ICT technologies 
are increasingly being used as media for counterfeiting. Through the emerging technologies 
and increased proliferation of e-commerce, it has become easier for counterfeiters with an 
enhanced ease of escaping detection where illicit traders operate anonymously, more easily 
duplicate and avail counterfeit goods but also at times even advertise and offer genuine 
products for sale but deliver counterfeits.38  
 
90% of the pharma-products in Kenya are generics, which are between 70%-90% cheaper than 
their brandname counterparts.39 A misconceptualisation between generic and counterfeits, 
would significantly affect access to affordable healthcare. This confusion is precisely what a 
broadened scoping of what are counterfeits under Kenyan law, does. 
 
An unabated and thriving illicit pharma-enterprise, caused by an ineffective legal system, 
negatively impacts the investments and well-being of legitimate pharma businesses; whose 
genuine products are targeted by counterfeiters. These destroy legitimate markets, reduces their 
market share and leads to loss of employment with closure of legitimate business.40 Counterfeit 
pharma products also negatively affect the health and wellbeing of consumers, as these 
counterfeit products are often unapproved by the regulatory authorities including the Pharmacy 
and Poisons Board and the Kenya Bureau of Standards, but also pose a national security risk 
including through availing funds for criminal enterprise. Some legitimate businesses are 
constrained to make reparations for product liability issues to consumers, if only to salvage 
their blurred Trademarks and tarnished reputation incurring further losses. 
 
Kenya has enacted a sui generis law targeted at combating counterfeits generally, but as 
evinced in this study, the anti-counterfeit legal system is ineffective first due to its broadened 
scope as to what under Kenyan Law is counterfeit. The broad scope under Section 2, Anti-
Counterfeit Act extends the scope of counterfeit definition not just to any and all registered IP 
but further to any such IP registered in Kenya and anywhere else in the world. This vague 
definition creates ambiguities and challenges discussed herein including possible curtailment 
of right to access healthcare through threatening use of generics as counterfeits.41 Secondly 
Kenya’s legal system is ineffective for want of capacity in the law enforcement who are now 
                                                          
35Sihanya B, Intellectual Property and Innovation Law in Kenya and Africa, 463. 
36ICC-CIB, ‘Getting a Feel for the size of the Problem’, 2.  
37Sihanya B, Intellectual Property and Innovation Law in Kenya and Africa, 459. 
38Sihanya B, Intellectual Property and Innovation Law in Kenya and Africa, 459, 460 & 461. 
39Susan Anyanu-Amu, Kenya Anti-counterfeit Law Violates Right to Health; www.IPSnews.net/2009/12/kenya-
anti-counterfeit-law-violates-right-to-health/ on 31 December, 2009. 
40Sihanya B, Intellectual Property and Innovation Law in Kenya and Africa, 466 & 467. 
41Susan Anyanu-Amu, Kenya Anti-counterfeit Law Violates Right to Health. 
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required to seize IP that they’d otherwise require specialised training to properly discern. 
Finally, The Kenyan legal system, is unresponsive to the emerging challenge of counterfeits 
traded through e-commerce, which render some of the remedies currently in law as impractical. 
Often complications arise on the law to be applied and where to assert the infringement in light 
of the e-commerce transaction i.e. choice of law and choice of forum questions. Further, the 
nature of online transactions poses a challenge on effective enforcement as traders (both those 
involved in counterfeits and genuine goods) are anonymous. The traditional sanctions such as 
forfeiture, seizure inter alia are also not appropriate. 
 
Nonetheless much as effective counterfeit laws are key, the monopoly inherent in grant of IPRs, 
also poses a major challenge for a developing economy like Kenya’s, where the genuine 
pharma products are often unaffordable for most. Arguably, the counterfeiters facilitate 
technology transfer, create employment within their illicit-enterprises; some possibly even 
remit tax and create competition for legitimate traders – with attendant benefits from 
competition as that from licit trade.42  
 
There is certainly an effectiveness gap, evinced by the tri-issues above, making a clear case for 
reform of Kenya’s anti-counterfeiting law. In so doing is it in the country’s greater interest to 
adopt such stringent enforcement, especially where for pharma products inaccessibility and 
unavailability invites almost certain literal fatal consequences. Is it available for the IP system 
to be structured to countenance the interests of traders, manufactures, industrialists, researchers 
and consumers? 
 
1.3 Objectives of the Research 
 
No meaningful attempts have been actualised to quantify the scale of pharma counterfeiting 
and the consequences thereof for businesses, consumers and society.43 This study therefore:  
 
(i) First, establishes the effects of the illicit counterfeit industry on growth of Kenya’s 
pharma-industry44 vis-à-vis the effect on her socio-economic development.  
(ii) Secondly, it explores the efficacy of Kenya’s legal regime in the enforcement 
against counterfeits, as against the core tri-challenges of scoping of counterfeits, the 
enforcement capacity and the menace of counterfeiting in the online marketplace. 
(iii) Ultimately, it demonstrates through recommendations for reform, that aligning 
Kenya’s anti-counterfeiting legal regime, with international best practise; will 
realise an exponential growth of its pharma industry through better securing the 
IPRs for innovators and investors in the pharma-industry, erstwhile positively 
impacting the country’s socio-economic development and the access to right to 
health.  
                                                          
42Sihanya, B, Intellectual Property and Innovation Law in Kenya and Africa. 
43European Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), ‘Economic Cost of IPR Infringement in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry (Quantification of Infringement in Pharmaceutical Preparations), 2016. 
44 Mwangi W, ‘Big Pharma’s healthy contribution’, 18   
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1.4 Research Questions 
 
1. What is the effect of counterfeiting on the growth of Kenya’s pharmaceutical industry, and 
the country’s overall socio-economic development? 
2. What is the current legal system formulated to combat counterfeiting of pharmaceutical 
products in Kenya, vis-à-vis her obligations under various Intellectual Property Treaties; 
and is Kenya’s anti-counterfeiting legal system effective? 
3. In mitigating the effects of counterfeiting, what are the recommended solutions from other 
jurisdictions for enhanced enforcement within the identified tri-core challenges of scoping 
of what counterfeits are in Kenya, enforcement capacity and counterfeiting in the online 
sphere?  
 
1.5 Literature Review 
 
IPRs have been defined as property in the intangible that protect innovation and rewards 
innovation activity. Sikoyo, Nyukuri and Wakhungu note that, “IPRs comprise a bundle of 
rights focusing on the physical manifestations of intellectual activity in any field of human 
endeavour. IPRs are concerned with the expression of an idea for an invention, the details of 
which have been worked out and which takes the form of a product or process that can be 
applied industrially. Development over a century has given rise to various IPRs, which have 
become well known. These include Patents, Trade and Service Marks, Copyright, rights in 
performances, Designs, Plant Breeders’ Rights, Utility Models, Appellations of Origins, layout 
designs and topography”.45 
 
The legal regime established in enforcement of IPRs necessarily impacts the level of innovation 
and commercialisation of the innovations. However, to determine the efficacy of the regime of 
protection adopted, a study of Kenya’s anti-counterfeit law vis-à-vis its international 
obligations and comparison to the laws adopted in other jurisdictions, is instructive.  
 
Economist Keith Maskus, argues that stronger IPR Protection, translates to increased economic 
growth and technological development, but only if well-structured.46 Maskus further cautions, 
that stronger IPR protection in isolation will not improve prospects of economic growth and 
development. He argues that there is need to activate an array of other influences including 
macro and micro economic policies e.g. taxation, support for literary and technological 
education, openness to international trade and investment of the one part and embedding IP 
systems within coherent socio-economic policies and transparent regulation of the other. Fisher 
similarly urges that, “the economic and cultural importance of this collection of IPR rules is 
increasing rapidly. The fortunes of many businesses and industry now depend heavily on the 
investment and protection of IPRs.” Additionally, the WHO estimates that antimicrobial 
resistance (AMR) could kill 10 million people yearly by 2050. WHO attributes the growth of 
                                                          
45Sikoyo G, et al, ‘Intellectual Property Protection in Africa’, 1, 
46Maskus K, Intellectual Property Challenges for Developing Countries: An Economic Perspective (2001).  
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AMR to the use of counterfeit drugs that catalyze the resistance against various pharmaceutical 
regimes as such there are health47 and security of nations largely threatened by counterfeiters. 
 
Kenyans prefer counterfeit products, due to their general affordability, which allows them 
access to products and services that would be the preserve of the middle and upper class – this 
according to a 2011 research by Synovate.48 The magnitude of the problem especially in 
Kenya’s pharma industry is exposed in A. Jack’s 2012 publication Faking It. He studied the 
scale of counterfeiting and attempts to crack down, and observed that reportedly HIV patients 
in Kenya are affected by Counterfeit ARVs.49 The ICC-CIB aptly summarise the premise for 
this study, by asserting that, “effective protection of Intellectual Property is vital to encourage 
research and innovation, international trade and investment, and sound economic growth and 
development”.50 It is not enough to provide for creation and recognition of IPRs, and avail 
opportunities for commercial exploitation, effective IP systems must aptly enforce the IPRs.  
 
It is observed that counterfeits occasion significant negative effects51 inter alia result in loss of 
brand value and tarnishing of trademarks, secondly it causes losses in revenue for legitimate 
business and in turn the revenue they would have paid in taxes. Third the illicit trade leads to 
a reduction and destruction of market share for the genuine business and even closure of licit 
businesses ultimately leading to job losses. The consumer is also a big looser as investment in 
potent pharma products will be dis-incentivised against the backdrop of little to no return on 
investment innovation. 
 
Susan Sell urges that data, on levels of counterfeiting is inauthentic and deliberately conjured 
up by fear-mongering business interests to urge for stronger IPR protection. Worse still she 
observes the linkages of counterfeits to security threats and health, and maximalising the scope 
of IPRs that are amenable to criminal enforcement, is a global scheme to protect private interest 
using public resources.52   
 
It has similarly been urged that a weakened or less strenuous enforcement against counterfeits 
is good for initial growth. In making a case for the weakened enforcement systems in 
developing economies, it has been urged that supposedly such absence enforcement will help 
these governments save on forex exchange, that would otherwise have been spent on genuinely 
importing the technology. The saved forex would be applied to other pressing needs. Further 
the proponents of this supposition urge that this will enable the pharma-industry grow 
expeditiously and often the Swiss, Indian and Pakistani pharma-industries are cited as 
examples. Counterfeit trade supposedly further facilitates technology-transfer, increases 
                                                          
47Vepachedu R, ‘COUNTERFEIT MEDICINES - Code Red now to RACE’  
48Business Daily Online, “Survey shows why Kenyans opt for goods from China” published on 2 March, 2011  
http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Corporate+News/Survey+shows+why+Kenyans+opt+for+goods+from+Chi
na/-539550/1117194/-/view/printVersion/-/1q9jei/-/index.html 
49 Jack A, ‘Faking It’ 345 7884, The British Medical Journal, 2012, 28-29. 
50 ICC-CIB, ‘Getting a feel of the size of the problem’ The International Anti-Counterfeiting Directory (2005), 3,  
51Sihanya B, Intellectual Property and Innovation Law in Kenya and Africa, 466 & 467. 
52Sell S, The Global IP Upward Ratchet, Anti-counterfeiting and Piracy Enforcement Efforts: The State of Play, 
2010, PIJIP Research Paper No 15 American University Washington College of Law, Washington DC.   
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choices for consumers and creates competition for legitimate traders.53 These short to mid-term 
benefits are however far outweighed by the need to effectively curb the counterfeits due to the 
entrenched negative impact. 
 
Is the enforcement regime complicit on existence of ‘illicit-innovation’ through a thriving 
‘black-market’ of counterfeits? ‘Illicit-innovation’ must be addressed holistically including a 
review of how competition can be lawfully facilitated, without compromising or diluting the 
protection of IPRs. India offers an excellent exposition with the accessibility to affordable 
healthcare.54 The commercial implication of an effective intellectual property protection is a 
significant policy consideration,55 which would position Kenya as an ideal investment 
destination that facilitates industry. IPRs are characteristically inherently territorial, as well as 
the national treatment principle under Article 3, TRIPS: but the world is increasingly becoming 
one global e-market; with increased reliance on imports/exports and the interventions identified 
must necessarily address this challenge. Investors are less likely to venture into markets where 
counterfeits are rampant, which is what an ineffective legal system enables.  
 
Africa is increasingly becoming a globally recognized destination as well as a transit for 
counterfeit goods destined for European and American markets, according to the World 
Customs Organisation’s Counterfeiting and Piracy Unit.56 Attempts continue to be made to 
redress this through various international agreements to enhance effective enforcement of IPRs. 
“…Intellectual property has increasingly become a strong feature of international, regional 
trade arrangements and national legal instruments. From multilateral to regional and bilateral 
trade relations, IP issues almost inevitably come to the fore as a critical issue to be considered 
in any deals that are struck. An example of these regimes is the free trade agreements that have 
become a feature in international trade relations. The United States has concluded such 
agreements with Latin and Central American and Caribbean countries individually, in groups 
and collectively. It also has an agreement with Australia, Morocco, the South African Customs 
Union (SACU) countries, Singapore and Thailand”.57 
 
The environment within which counterfeits thrive has been identified under TRIPS where 
members recognise that they must “reduce distortions and impediments to international trade, 
taking into account the need to promote effective and adequate protection of IPRs, and to ensure 
that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become 
                                                          
53Sihanya B, Intellectual Property and Innovation Law in Kenya and Africa, 472. 
54 Deepak S, ‘Patents and Competition Law: Identifying Jurisdictional Metes and Bounds in the Indian Context’ 
27(2) National Law School of India Review, 2015, 135-146. 
55 Duffy J, and Hynes R, ‘Statutory Domain and the Commercial Law of Intellectual Property’ 102(1) Virginia Law 
Review, 2016, 1-77. 
56Haman M, ‘Africa rising to the anti-counterfeiting challenge’ 5(5) Journal of Intellectual Property Law & 
Practice, 2010, 344–349. 
57Musungu S, ‘General Trends in the Field of Intellectual Property: Issues and Challenges for the Establishment 
of a Development Oriented Framework,’ Regional Dialogue on Intellectual Property Right, Innovation and 
Sustainable Development in Eastern and Southern Africa, Organized by the International Centre for Trade & 
Sustainable Development (ICTSD), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Sustainable Development 
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barriers to legitimate trade.”58 As with barriers to legitimate trade, illegitimate trade will find a 
niche and a need to exploit. Jeremy M. Wilson et al, urge for anti-counterfeiting legislation that 
enable legitimate trade but effectively proscribe and punish counterfeiters.59 Sell, 
acknowledges that what constitutes counterfeit varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.60 Kenya 
having elected to adopt a much broad conceptualisation of counterfeits, a super TRIPS 
compliant conceptualisation with no apparent benefit to enforcement against counterfeits.  
 
To understand the challenge posed in actualising this, regard must be had to the limitations 
posed by counterfeiting.61 Bush R et al, observe,62 that counterfeiting has continued to 
negatively impact businesses across the world; and in detailing the negative effects of 
counterfeiting further urge that unchecked counterfeiting could affect the world’s economy.  
 
There is certainly a need to effectively curb the prevalence of counterfeits. Globalisation has 
increased the risk related to counterfeit drugs, however Jack A’s article observes that pharma-
companies are reluctant to share the data and statistics on the high proliferation of counterfeit 
drugs due to fears of undermining public confidence in their products.63 Sikoyo G, Nyukuri E, 
and Wakhungu J64 in reviewing the status of laws, research and policy in select African 
Countries including Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana, South Africa and Uganda, urge for reform. 
However, hey caution that important lessons from comprehensive measures adopted in the 
West,65 cannot be limited to routine enactment of legislation and establishment of state 
agencies to address the menace of counterfeit. Due regard must be placed on the international 
community and private sector players as well as discerning the obligations accruing therefrom. 
Connected thereto Sihanya highlights that most Anglo-phone African countries like Kenya 
hitherto ‘imported’ the UK Trademarks Act, 1938 which did not have provisions designed to 
respond to wilful Trademark infringement as a criminal offence (the UK only amended their 
law in 1988 to make provision for this).66 With the enactment of TRIPS and the obligations 
under Article 61, which enjoins member states to provide for criminal prosecution and penalties 
for wilful trademark and copyright infringement at a commercial scale,67 some African 
countries like Kenya and South Africa have sui generis laws to combat counterfeit.   
 
Allan Sykes importantly highlights the dangers developing countries are exposed to due to poor 
enforcement of IPRs for pharma companies and he reckons that it has de-incentivized research 
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into ‘tropical’ diseases that have afflicted developing nations for a long time.68 Sihanya also 
enumerates the numerous negative effects of prevalent counterfeits, in demonstrating that the 
short to medium term benefits that may accrue from a permissive environment is long term 
detrimental to developing countries.69 
 
Significantly, Jack’s (2012) publication notes that there is an apparent averseness in publishing 
detailed data on the scale of pharma-counterfeits due to possible merchant-fears of eroding 
confidence in particular pharmaceutical products. He further notes that even the World Health 
Organisation (WHO) curiously does not keep an updated data base on the apparent huge 
magnitude of counterfeit pharma-products.70 Sikoyo G, et al similarly note that there is limited 
literature on the effect of IPRs violations on trade and economic development; which 
suppositions necessitate inquiry by way of this study.71 
 
Additionally, Bush R, et al on their part urge for a critique of the role of the consumer in the 
proliferation of product counterfeiting,72 through what they describe as ‘consumer 
accomplices’. They argue that a significant adult population knowingly acquire counterfeit 
products – regardless of the risks attendant - where there is a price advantage: confirming that 
a review and remedy to the problem cannot be to the exclusion of the role of the consumer. 
Indicating that costs and accessibility of the genuine pharma-products impact the prevalence 
of counterfeits. 
 
It is therefore impossible to defer effective counterfeiting, but even more critically to facilitate 
growth of the pharmaceutical industry and the attendant socio-economic benefits: there is a 
need for an effective legal system geared at combating counterfeiting. The effective legal 
system striking a balance between consumer protection, investor/IPR owner and government. 
 
1.6 Research Hypothesis 
 
This study hypothesizes that, Kenya has an ineffective anti-counterfeiting legal regime, which 
regime is negatively influencing the growth of her pharmaceutical industry.  
 
This study further hypothesizes that the adoption of efficacious preventive and enforcement 
anti-counterfeiting measures, will positively influence the exploitation of the country’s 
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1.7 Theoretical Framework 
 
This research proceeds on the premise of the utilitarian theory, propounded by Jeremy 
Bentham; which, in the context of this study, observes that the enforcement and protection of 
IPRs by curbing proliferation of counterfeits necessarily results in the greatest benefit for the 
greatest number of the Kenyan citizenry. Effective fighting of counterfeit pharma-products will 
incentivize innovation, and greater quality amongst manufacturers who will be assured of 
returns. Effective enforcement will similarly eliminate the often dangerous counterfeit-pharma 
from circulation, protecting the citizenry from the harmful effects.  
 
Allan Sykes further highlights this premise by urging that failure to offer effective IPR 
protection to pharma companies has de-incentivised research into diseases that plague 
developing countries.73 Development of successful pharma-products requires great skill and 
judgment: before a product goes to market it requires expensively tedious regulatory approvals, 
clinical trials, huge marketing costs and additionally acquiring and safeguarding the IPRs 
through Trademarks and Patents.74 Assurance of recovery of these expenses critical incentive 
for the pharma-companies.  
 
This research in investigating the efficacy of apt anti-counterfeiting measures on Kenya’s 
pharma-industry, is anchored against this theoretical framework, and as further urged by 
Fisher’s three-fold exposition of “Utilitarianistic: IP conceptualisation”. He notes that three 
sub-sets/approaches of this utilitarianistic legal school of thought abound viz: 
 
1.7.1 Incentive Theory 
 
Fisher discusses this approach by illustrating William Nordhaus’s exposition on Patent law; 
which Fisher urges can be applied generally on protection of Intellectual Property; thus, 
“…Each increase in the duration or strength of patents, he observed, stimulates an increase in 
inventive activity. The resultant gains to social welfare include the discounted present value of 
the consumer surplus and producer surplus associated with the distribution of the intellectual 
products whose creation is thereby induced.”75 Proliferation of counterfeits will negate this 
object, as this research demonstrates. The converse is equally true, that R&D will be 
encouraged, through a guaranteed fair opportunity of return on investment.   
 
This paper’s premise is supported by Sihanya’s supposition that effective enforcement (through 
redressing the tri-issues herein) translates to good returns for IPR holders, creation of jobs in 
the sector to help exploit the IPRs and realise revenue for government.76  
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74Sihanya B, Intellectual Property and Innovation Law in Kenya and Africa, 445. 
75 Nordhaus WD, Invention, growth, and welfare: A theoretical treatment of technological change, 1969, 
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1.7.2 Optimizing Patterns of Productivity Theory 
 
Proponents of this approach urge that, “the copyright and patent systems play the important 
roles of letting potential producers of intellectual products know what consumers want and thus 
channelling productive efforts in directions most likely to enhance consumer welfare”.77 
 
Paul Goldstein as cited by Fisher notes that, “…The logic of property rights dictates their 
extension into every corner in which people derive enjoyment and value from literary and 
artistic works. To stop short of these ends would deprive producers of the signals of consumer 
preference that trigger and direct their investments.”78 Drawing a nexus between the 
investments put in by IPR owners and the level of protection accorded to their inventions and 
innovations. 
 
Protection of trademarks is the law’s recognition of the psychological function of symbols. If 
it is true love symbols, it is no less true that we purchase goods by them.79 This heavily 
underscores theoretical premise for this paper, in highlighting the need to protect the consumer 
and assuring her of the source of a particular product associated with a certain Trademark but 
also protect the owner of the Trademark from persons riding on the notoriety of her 
brand/symbol. 
 
1.7.3 The Rivalrous Invention Theory 
 
The third approach urged by Fisher is one which concerns what he describes as, an “objective 
to eliminate or reduce the tendency of intellectual-property rights to foster duplicative or 
uncoordinated inventive activity.’80 This approach focuses on the effect of competition among 
firms to develop and patent rights, necessarily addressing economic waste that is likely to arise 
from an imprudent application of IPRs – not within the province of the research herein. 
 
William Fisher, further captures the relevance of utilitarianism in development of an 
understanding of Intellectual property by urging that, “The primary economic benefits of 
trademarks, they contend, are (1) the reduction of consumers' "search costs" (because it's easier 
to pick a box of "Cheerios" off the grocery shelf than to read the list of ingredients on each 
container, and because consumers can rely upon their prior experiences with various brands of 
cereal when deciding which box to buy in the future) and (2) the creation of an incentive for 
businesses to produce consistently high-quality goods and services (because they know that 
their competitors cannot, by imitating their distinctive marks, take a free ride on the consumer 
good will that results from consistent quality).  Trademarks, Landes and Posner claim, also 
have an unusual ancillary social benefit:  they improve the quality of our language.  By 
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increasing our stock of nouns and by “creating words or phrases that people value for their 
intrinsic pleasingness (sic) as well as their information value,” they simultaneously economize 
on communication costs and make conversation more pleasurable.”81 
 
In this instance this study interrogated the observation by Sikoyo G, et al,82 that Intellectual 
Property Rights are intricately related to trade, competition, industrial growth and economic 
development. They observe that IPRs incentivise innovation and invention as mechanisms for 
market protection.  
 
Fisher aptly sums up this concern and observes that, “empirical work has suggested that patent 
law has been more important in stimulating innovation in certain industries (e.g. 
pharmaceuticals and chemicals) than in others, but has failed to answer the ultimate question 
of whether the stimulus to innovation is worth its costs.” 
 
1.8 Research Methodology and Approach 
 
This study is structured within the framework of a descriptive design in ascertaining the extent 
and effect of proliferation of counterfeit products within Kenya’s pharmaceutical sub-sector. 
The study aims at discerning the efficacy of legal regime established to curb the counterfeits.  
 
This study relies on an examination of primary data and subsequently analyses of trends from 
the pharma-industry, on the levels of counterfeits in Kenya’s pharma-industry. Separately, the 
study extensively reviews secondary data obtained from literature in books, journal articles, 
research reports inter alia on various issues such as foundational questions on utility of 
Intellectual Protection (and particularly anti-counterfeiting as a key component of IP protection 
systems) in developing economies vis-à-vis the effect on socio-economic development; against 
the background of increased globalisation in trade.  
 
In data collection, aside from reviewing reports prepared from with Kenya’s key enforcement 
agencies on matters of pharma-counterfeiting i.e. the Anti-counterfeit Authority83 (ACA), the 
Kenya Bureau of Standards84 (KEBS), the Kenya Revenue Authority85 (KRA), the Pharmacy 
and Poisons Board (PPB) and the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) this research 
also interrogates reports by key players within the pharma-industry.   
 
The research identifies select case studies from which it can pursue in-depth reviews of the 
research questions posed herein. This paper addresses some self-help anti-counterfeiting 
measures; the effect of this strategy and the variations on the effect on their businesses if any. 
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Ultimately recognising the territorial nature of IPRs, the research additionally approaches the 
enquiry hereon through a comparative study of the measures adopted and employed by the 
United States of America to curb counterfeits and the effect on the pharma sub-sector. 
Additionally, the research considers the approaches by the Republic of South Africa in anti-
counterfeiting measures as a strong influence for the growth of their pharmaceutical industry.  
 
1.9 Limitations and Assumptions 
 
The study is limited to a review of the pharmaceutical sector due to a presumption that this 
sub-sector within the larger manufacturing sector is the most targeted for counterfeiting. 
Further, the research in adopting a non-probabilistic sampling method, will be confined to a 
review of purposefully identified corporates within the pharmaceutical manufacturing sub-
sector. This sampling may expose the research to peculiarities of the sampled corporates. 
 
This research also recognises other influences at a macro and micro level on the growth of a 
sustainable pharmaceutical manufacturing industry in Kenya, including responsive 
government policies on taxation, cost and availability of various factors of production. 
Ultimately, redressing counterfeiting may not of itself solely revamp Kenya’s pharma-
manufacturing industry and positively influence the growth of this industry. The particular role 
and proportional impact of these inter-related influences have not been considered in this study. 
 
Variously Kenyan law establishes numerous classes of Intellectual Property Rights, however 
this paper considered what it determines as key Intellectual Property Rights, as defined by the 
Kenyan Anti-counterfeit law, that are the subject of counterfeiters targeting the pharma-
manufacturing sector i.e. Trademarks.86 In discussing the efficacy of the Kenyan legal regime 
in enforcement against counterfeits, the paper does not extend to the question of observance of 
rule of law in Kenya, a subsequent concern after establishment of a responsive legal regime. 
 
As admitted in various studies cited herein, most corporates are not willing to divulge actual 
data/statistics on the extent of counterfeits against their IPRs. This reluctance is due to 
(mis)apprehension of possible negative perception(s) from consumers of their products who 
might refrain from further purchases due to feared inability to distinguish counterfeits from 
authentic. Ms Rita Hayes, the Deputy Director General, WIPO charges that “The private sector 
has to let us know exactly what we’re looking for. How do you get governments to pay attention 
if you don’t have good statistics?” 87 This limitation on availability of reliable statistics 
necessarily impacted the outcomes of this study, but its is mitigated by data complied from 
various empirical studies and reports considered in this paper. 
 
The research was limited by unavailability of updated reports; especially from government 
agencies relevant to this study on the IPR enforcement regime. To redress this challenge, the 
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research reached out directly to the leadership of these state agencies. There was also a 
limitation of time within which to conduct indepth fieldwork and/or interviews, which 
interviews would have helped to fact-check the reports. 
 
The research faced a limitation in unavailability or limited availability of verifiable data on the 
quantity of counterfeit pharmaceutical drugs in Kenya, which was intended to be necessary in 
drawing various empirical inferences in this paper. The paper relied on secondary reports. 
 
1.10 Chapter Breakdown  
 
This study is structured into four chapters with the first chapter availing a context for issues 
which the paper sets-out to address. It introduces Kenya’s pharmaceutical sub-sector’s current 
sub-optimal performance. It further supposes that pharma-sector’s growth is hampered by the 
proliferation of counterfeits. It explores introduces various literature and explores the 
utilitarianism theory as a rationale for recognition and enforcement of IPRS. 
 
The second chapter reviews the legal regime currently obtaining in Kenya on counterfeiting. It 
considers international treaties and municipal law enacted to curb pharma-counterfeiting. 
These laws establish various institutions including the Anti-Counterfeit Authority (ACA), the 
Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA), the Kenya Bureau of Standards (KEBS), the Pharmacy and 
Poisons Board whose mandates are intended to curb pharma-counterfeits. It considers the 
extent of the civil legal regime contiguous to curbing pharma-counterfeits. The second chapter 
also considers the scope of protection availed through the very definition of counterfeit(s) under 
the Kenyan anti-counterfeit legal regime vis-à-vis the standards of the country’s obligations 
under various IP treaties; being minded of the territoriality of IPRs. The chapter interrogates 
the definition and conceptualisation of the scope of what is counterfeit under Kenyan law; as 
well as the governance and institutional challenges in enforcement of counterfeits. This chapter 
concludes by ultimately considering Kenya’s policy considerations Kenya in enforcement 
against pharma-counterfeiting and how the judiciary has applied these laws to give effect to 
IPRs threatened with counterfeited. 
 
The third chapter examines the causal effect (if at all) of counterfeiting on growth of the 
pharma-sector. It considers the data and statistics on the extent of counterfeits afflicting the 
Kenyan pharma-sector. In further setting out an exposition of the extent of counterfeits within 
this sector, the chapter considers the three (3) core challenges identified as impeding the 
country’s current enforcement regime in curbing counterfeit with particular focus on first, 
scoping of counterfeits; secondly inadequate capacity of the enforcement agencies; and lastly, 
proliferation of counterfeit pharma in the online market place. Subsequent to highlighting these 
challenges, the chapter equally focuses on a comparative study of the best practices on the 





Chapter Four will itemise the findings of this study and it will address the efficacy of the 
solutions that are available to curb counterfeits and recommendations to effectively enforce 
IPRs to boost the pharma industry in Kenya and lessons learnt especially against the identified 
core challenges. 
 
The research will conclude by recommending reform measures to the Kenyan legal regime 
with regard to its stratification and scope of counterfeits, enforcement measures available. At 
a regional level this paper will urge for reciprocity in the IPR laws of EAC member states and 
subsequent recognition of registrations in member states allowing for cross-border seizure 
raids. Indeed, this research also explores the effective use of public campaigns, market survey 
and pricing by the foreign pharmaceutical companies in a manner responsive to Kenya and 
possibly urge for active pursuit of generics to avoid genuine pharma-drugs pricing themselves 
into the hands of counterfeiters. The paper explores available self-help measures to curb 
counterfeits in the online market place, as well as consideration of possible extrapolation of the 
exceptions to the ‘safe habor’ principles as a means of mitigating against facilitation of online 
infringement through online marketplace operators. Significantly the paper addresses the 
scoping of counterfeits under Kenyan law, as a means to ensure effective enforcement and the 
ACA’s capacity to respond thereto. 
 
Ultimately the study’s recommendations in acknowledging the role of an IP system 
wholesomely in development, it will evince the necessity to enhance the enforcement 
component of an IP system – particularly through anti-counterfeiting - as a measure of 























2.0 Chapter Two: Analysis of Kenya’s Legal System postulated to Curb 
Pharma-Counterfeiting 
 
Globally, the Pharmaceutical sector is understandably a highly regulated sector due to its direct 
impact on human health, and its potential for huge returns for innovators and investors. As a 
preliminary this paper notes that a responsive legal system would need to address a balancing 
of these often-competing interests. Consequently, the legal system targeted at curbing 
counterfeiting of pharmaceutical products is, in most jurisdictions, the subject of a myriad laws 
and regulations. This regime includes laws applicable to the registration of pharmaceutical 
products before sale; protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights; criminal and 
penal proscription; to customs and border control; consumer protection inter alia 
 
Kenya is certainly no exception, and has enacted various national legislation to regulate her 
pharma-sector. This legal regime includes civil law remedies as well as penal provisions 
specifically intended to alleviate counterfeiting, including pharma-counterfeits. Significantly, 
Kenya is a signatory of the World Trade Organisation’s Agreement on Trade-related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) which enjoins her to observe defined minimum levels 
in border measures and criminal IPR protection, erstwhile alleviating barriers to legitimate 
pharma trade.88 Ergo, this chapter considers Kenya’s legal regime and more particularly its 
efficacy in eradicating pharma counterfeiting as against this international standard. However, 
much as this paper centres its discussion on the Kenyan legal regime and its efficacy, it 
acknowledges the concomitant challenge on disregard and/or non-observance of the rule of law 
in Kenya, apt legal provisions notwithstanding evinced through repeated disregard of court 
orders by the government and members of the public. 
 
Kenya’s Constitution promulgated on 27th August, 2010 and billed as one of the most 
progressive constitutions globally, particularly on its entrenchment of fundamental rights and 
freedoms, it variously recognises and entrenches the protection of IPRs.  
 
First, the Constitution under Article 2(6) provides that “any treaty or convention ratified by 
Kenya shall form part of the law of Kenya under this Constitution”89. Nonetheless, Kenya has 
enacted the Treaty Making and Ratification Act, No. 45 of 2012, intended to give effect to 
Article 2(6) of the Constitution, by providing the manner of executing and subsequently 
domesticating international treaties to which Kenya becomes a signatory. The significance of 
this constitutional provision is inter alia the legal recognition of Kenya’s obligations accruing 
under various IPR related treaties particularly the TRIPS to wit she is a signatory.90 Ergo in 
establishing an apt regime, regard must be had to the obligations accruing under the various 
treaties.  
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Secondly, Article 11(2)(c), Constitution of Kenya enjoins the state to protect the IPRs of the 
people of Kenya. The State is equally enjoined with the responsibility to protect property as 
well as enhance intellectual property rights of the people of Kenya under Article 40(5) as read 
with Article 260, which later provision defines property to include intellectual property. So that 
the obligation to curb counterfeiting is imposed as against the state as a public law right. 
 
Concomitantly, Article 46, Constitution of Kenya provides, in the context of this study, for the 
right to pharma-products of reasonable quality that protects the health, safety and economic 
interests as well as the right to compensation for losses arising from defects in pharma-
products. Whereas, Article 43 further provides for every person’s right to the highest attainable 
standard of health, which includes the right to health services. Against these additional 
entrenchments the Kenyan Constitution does proscribe counterfeit pharma which might have 
the effect of negating these entrenchments. 
 
Under Article 2(1), the Constitution binds all state organs at all levels of government, and the 
obligations afore-referenced enjoin the Kenyan government to at all levels recognize, protect 
and enforce pharma-IPRs including observance of internationally covenanted minimum 
standards. The enforcement of IPRs, which characteristically includes curbing counterfeiting 
vis-à-vis Kenya’s pharma-sector therefore has demonstrable strong constitutional 
underpinning. This Constitutional entrenchment is significant in asserting the protection of the 
rights accruing to holders of pharma-IPRs. 
 
2.1 Civil law regime against counterfeiting 
 
Kenya has a litany of civil laws enacted to recognise and protect against IPR infringement 
through availing civil remedies i.e. private law rights. These include the Kenya Copyright Act, 
2001 (as amended), the Industrial Property Institute Act, 2001, The Trademarks Act, CAP 506, 
and the Seeds and Plant Varieties Act. These laws protect various ‘genres’ of intellectual 
property rights (IPRs). These ordinarily require the IPR owner undertaking enforcement action 
in the nature of a suit contending alleged infringement of their property rights. 
 
Connected thereto Kenya has equally enacted various statutory enactments with the effect of 
fighting counterfeits but still largely falling as civil law remedies. These include the Standards 
Act, CAP 496, Weights and Measures Act, CAP 513, Law of Contract Act, CAP 23, 
Competition Act, 2010, Kenya Revenue Authority Act, 1995 (import and export regulation), 
Sale of Goods Act, CAP 31, Registration of Business Names, CAP 499 as well as common 
law. These legislations essentially concern contractual liability and product liability; tortious 
liability and breach of statutory duty. More significantly these pieces of legislation focus of 
conventional (physical) goods and as Sihanya notes, ‘are often fossilized versions of similar 
statutes from the United Kingdom, United states of America or even common law.91 These are 
highly unresponsive and certainly ineffective pieces of legislation for purposes of curbing 
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pharma-counterfeits or even counterfeits generally. It is for these reason that with signing of 
the TRIPS in 1995, and the obligations accruing for effective provision of a legal system for 
prevention and obtaining of remedies for infringement of conferred rights – it became 
necessary for Kenya to consider enactment of an appropriate regime making provisions for 
border control measures and criminal sanctions in compliance with Article 61, TRIPS.  
 
Materially this research urges for accurate scoping of counterfeits through conceptualisation 
this as limited to wilful trademark counterfeiting: and those trademarks registered in Kenya. 
As such it is significant to particularly consider the law under which trademarks are registered 
in Kenya.  
 
Trademarks in Kenya may be registered under Section 12 and 13 of the Trademark Act for 
distinctive marks or those adopted to distinguish. Section 7 and 8 itemise the rights conferred 
upon registration. A trademark owner may institute proceedings at the High Court contending 
that her trademark has been infringed contrary to Section 7 and/or 8, Trademarks Act. The 
Relief ordinarily issued upon success in court involves an injunctive order, an order for 
damages, account for profits and an order for delivery up for destruction essentially private 
rights; enforced by IPR owners themselves. 
 
However, in as far as counterfeiting and criminal offences involving trademarks are concerned 
the Trademarks Act only concerns itself with offences of falsification of entries in the 
trademark register, and falsely representing that a mark is a registered trademark whereas it is 
not under Sections 57 and 58, Trademarks Act respectively. Further Sections 57C and 57D 
prohibit forgery of a registered trademark and ultimately Section 58E proscribes sale or 
importation of goods with a forged registered trademark. The maximum penalty here is a fine 
of KES 500000 (Approx. USD 5000) and/or 5 years imprisonment. 
 
Rutenberg et al however urge that the Kenya Industrial Property Institute (KIPI) which 
administers trademarks in Kenya, plays a limited role –if at all- in enforcement of trademarks; 
but that in any event this role centers on adjudging opposition and rectification proceedings 
under Sections 21 and 35 Trademarks Act. They additionally urge that infact KIPI’s none 
involvement in enforcement is part of reason that led to creation of the Anti-counterfeit 
Authority (ACA).92 
 
2.2 Criminal law regime against counterfeiting 
 
Kenya’s primary applies the Anti-Counterfeit Act, 2008, (as amended) as complemented by 
the Pharmacy and Poisons Act, CAP 244, as well as the Penal Code, CAP 63; and the Kenya 
Revenue Authority Act, 1995. 
 
                                                          
92Rutenberg, I, Ouma M and Munyi P, ‘Kenya’: In International Encyclopedia of Laws: Intellectual Property Law 
(ed) Hendrik Vanhaes Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2019, 159. 
28 
 
2.2.1 The Anti-Counterfeiting Act, 2008 (as amended) 
 
The Anti-Counterfeit Act is the primary legislation enacted to prohibit trade in counterfeit 
goods in Kenya. This law93 creates various offences, defines the scope of protection but also 
establishes enforcement organs including the Anti-Counterfeit Authority (ACA) and the 
ACA’s functions being defined thereunder as well.94 Before the enactment of this law, in 2008, 
the Penal Code CAP 63 acted as the main legislation against counterfeiting (through provisions 
enacted in 1957 and amended in 1962!).95 
 
Of Particular importance to this study is the scope the Act accords to counterfeits, and 
consequently the scope of what the law proscribes as counterfeits, and confers anti-counterfeit 
protection to. This has been highlighted in this study as one of the 3 core challenges hampering 
the effective enforcement against counterfeit pharma. 
 
In addition to enlightening and informing the public, combating counterfeiting trade and other 
dealings in Kenya, the ACA is required to co-ordinate with national, regional and international 
organizations in counterfeiting. The amended Act includes an advisory role for the ACA in 
respect of the Cabinet Secretary on how best to promote and protect IPRs, as well the extent of 
counterfeiting. It is equally enjoined to conduct studies on counterfeiting and protection of 
IPRs96. The recent amendments appear to evince a systematic increase in the ACA’s mandate 
and scope of protection accorded to IPR holders. 
 
The Act problematically defines counterfeit, first as the unauthorised use (within a commercial 
context) of intellectual property registered in Kenya, or elsewhere (outside Kenya). This blurs 
the well-recognised principle on territoriality within intellectual property law. On an 
enforcement perspective, this provision confers protection to IPRs registered outside Kenya 
and outside the recognised registration systems that would ensure standards set in other 
legislations have been met. Secondly, The Act also defines with specificity what counterfeiting 
in the context of medicine would be said to extend to.97 However, wholesomely other IPRs 
obtaining in pharma products including pharma-patents would otherwise avail themselves to 
the protection available under the Act, but seemingly in conflict with the very same Act in its 
definition of counterfeit medicine. The attempt at having a sui generis system, on the 
contextualisation appears to be creating a contradiction and challenge in implementation. 
Third, (ancillary to the scope of protection created under the definition of counterfeit under 
the Act) a new provision of the Anti-Counterfeit Act at Section 34B is the establishment of a 
Trademarks Recordation system that empowers the ACA to create a mechanism for registration 
of trademarks. The system is detailed setting out the criteria and procedure for registration 
including allowing for removals. This system is intended to aid the ACA better monitor 
                                                          
93 Section 3, Anti-Counterfeit Act, 2008, (as amended by the Statute Law (Miscellaneous Amendments), No 18 
of 2018). 
94 Section 5, Anti-Counterfeiting Act, 2008. 
95 Sections 380 – 381, Penal Code, CAP 63 Laws of Kenya. 
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97 Section 3, Anti-Counterfeit Act, 2008.  
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imported counterfeit products into the country at various points of entry. The ACA is yet to 
publish the regulations (including affixing the attendant fees for the recordation) 
operationalizing this provision, which is scheduled for enforcement effective 1st July, 2019. 
 
The TRIPS has created minimum obligations on the members in their conceptualisation of 
counterfeiting. First it limits the scope to trademarks (and not IPRs generally), and, further to 
trademarks registered in a particular member state. Kenya’s apparent over-compliance i.e. 
TRIPS++ is unwarranted. The limitation accruing from scoping under the Act is also evinced 
in the implausibility of the ACA’s capacity, and technical competence to enforce infringement 
of the more technical IPRs including patents. It is therefore defeatist, to have a provision 
improbable to be enforced. Indeed this challenge with the scoping has been successfully 
challenged in court in the past;98 as it effectively would proscribe generic medicines which are 
in every respect different from counterfeit medicine and pharmaceuticals in general. In P.A.O 
& 2 Others V A.G (2012) eKLR the Courts had opportunity to consider the effect of the 
definition of Counterfeit under Section 2, of the Act and offences created under Sections 32 
and 34 of the Act. The Court found that the definition significantly compromised the right to 
health as enshrined under Article 43 of the Constitution. The court subsequently declared 
unconstitutional sections 2, 32 and 34 of the Act to the extent that it defined counterfeit to 
extend to IPRs registered in Kenya and elsewhere. The Act was amended to give effect to this 
determination.  
 
Significantly, this case highlighted the limitation imposed on enforcement of IPRs through 
counterfeiting, under a broadened definition, certainly extending over and above the country’s 
obligations under TRIPS. Curiously however, the recent amendments by the Kenyan 
Parliament vide Statute Law (Misc Amendment) No 18 of 2018 has redefined counterfeit to 
the very definition that had been declared unconstitutional! 
 
On organs established under the Act, and in addition to the Authority proper, the Act establishes 
the Authority’s Board which is appointed the Cabinet Secretary and consisting of the Principal 
Secretary in the Ministry of Trade, the Principal Secretary in the Ministry of Trade, the 
Attorney General, the Commissioner General Kenya Revenue Authority, Managing Director 
Kenya Bureau of Standards, and the Chief Executive Officer Kenya Association of 
Manufacturers and two members with 10 years’ experience in Counterfeiting or Intellectual 
Property, Consumer Protection and Trade.99 The Board’s main role is the formulation of 
policies for organization, management, implementation of objects of the Agency.  
 
It is important to note that the Act equally creates the Intellectual Property Enforcement Co-
ordination & Advisory Committee (IPECAC).100 IPECACs membership though undefined in 
law, would essentially comprise the same 14 members as the board, the Act also fails to define 
particular roles for this organ as set-out in law, this is a zero-sum-game. 
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Additionally, the Act establishes the office of the executive director, which aside from serving 
as the administrative head for the Authority, this office is also conferred with authority under 
the Act to record confessions from suspected counterfeiters and issue fines without the option 
of an appeal. This poses an enforcement challenge, in light of the absence of a defined 
procedure in law, on the recording of the confessions - contrast these lacunae with the Criminal 
Procedure Code, CAP 75 which has an elaborate process of recordal of confessions. Worse still 
no appellate mechanism from the decisions of the executive director is availed in law: exposing 
the system to possible abuse and/or manipulation.  
 
Further under Section 22 of the Act, the Board appoints inspectors to carry out the ACA’s 
functions who have police powers in their duties under the Act. The appointment of inspectors 
has to be gazetted, which confers wide ranging powers including entering, seizure, detention, 
destruction or any other reasonable measures where they suspect that there is production of 
counterfeit goods. These inspectors include pretty much everyone in IP administration in 
Kenya, and, minded of expanded the expanded scoping and broad powers of inspectors this 
would pose a challenge on the efficacy on the enforcement.  
 
Importantly, newly introduced under Section 23, the Statute Law (Misc. Amendment), 2018 
the Act expands the mandate of the anti-counterfeit inspectors to inter alia, “(4) power to 
investigate any offence related or connected to counterfeiting notwithstanding that such an 
offence is not expressed as such under the provisions of this Act.” This carte blanche is most 
curious to the extent that an inspector can investigate an ‘offence’ not expressed as such in law, 
what would be the consequence of preferring a charge on an offence not defined as such in 
law? what would be the utility of expending resources on a charge that cannot stand in law? Is 
the amendment purporting to vitiate a well settled principle on proffering criminal charges, to 
strictly an offence proscribed by statute, with the penalty similarly set-out thereunder. 
 
Further, (on the powers of the ACA inspectors) the amended law, now obligates an ACA 
inspector to necessarily first procure a warrant to allow them entry to premises suspected to 
have counterfeit goods, obtained before a magistrate101. It allows the inspectors to access the 
premises even in absence of the owner, but under the authority of the Court. This qualifies the 
inspectors’ powers which earlier allowed them to undertake seizure raids whenever a complaint 
was lodged with the ACA without prior requiring warrants.102 
 
Part IV of the Act deals with counterfeit goods and defines offences in counterfeiting to be 
those of possession, manufacturing, sell/hire out, exposition, exportation, importation and 
disposal of counterfeit goods.103 Any intellectual property holder (now IPRs subsisting in 
Kenya or elsewhere) can lodge a complaint with the Executive Director of the ACA for 
offences under this Part at Section 32 as long as they can demonstrate that they are entitled to 
lay the said claim, i.e. that the goods in question are protected goods as well as that there prima 
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31 
 
facie exists an intellectual property, with a reasonable suspicion that there may be an offence 
under Section 32 that has been committed.  
 
Significantly the Kenyan law at Section 32(f) proscribes, ‘import into, transit through, transship 
within or export from Kenya, except for private and domestic use of the importer or exporter 
as the case may be, any counterfeit goods’. This provision is designed to insulate Kenya as a 
transport-corridor for counterfeit goods. In Panyahululu Limited V Anti-Counterfeit Agency 
& Another and Societe Bic High Court Mombasa Pet 59 of 2013, the Courts had opportunity 
to consider the seizure of suspected counterfeit products trans-shipped through Kenya. In this 
suit the Anti-Counterfeit Authority had seized a consignment of ball-point pens, suspected to 
be counterfeit bearing (without authorization in the course of trade) the “Bic” Trademark 
registered in Kenya. The consignment was nonetheless destined for Uganda, (where the “Bic” 
trademark was supposedly not registered) through the port of Mombasa.  
 
The ACA had sought to prosecute the Petitioners in a criminal case and the Petitioners lodged 
this constitutional petition challenging the propriety of the charges against it and sought to bar 
the ACA from proffering the charges against it. In fact, the Petitioner additionally argued that 
the interested party had unsuccessfully challenged the Petitioner’s use of the interested party’s 
“Bic” registered trademark in Uganda where the goods were destined, and as such there was 
no premise to detain the consignment in Kenya.  
 
The court disallowed the Petition finding that the ACA was justified to seize the suspected 
counterfeit consignment, on account of unauthorized user of a trademark registered in Kenya. 
The case highlights the Court’s interpretation of the mandate of the ACA to seize suspected 
counterfeit goods on trans-shipment. 
 
The Act further outlines the process of prosecuting suspected counterfeited goods under 
Section 34, but also importantly sets-out the powers of the Commissioner of Customs (which 
powers under the amendment law are equally disjunctively vested in the Executive Director 
and either of them can exercise these powers) in enforcement of suspected counterfeit goods at 
Kenya’s points of entry. 
 
The courts separately in Criminal Case No. 2762 of 2011 (Makadara), The Republic vs Fang 
Jiawei and Saiyili discharged the accused persons, Fang Jiawei and Saiyi Li, who had been 
charged with the offence of being in possession on the course of trade counterfeit goods 
contrary to section 32(2) as read with S. 35(1) of the Anti-Counterfeit Act 2008. However, the 
prosecution could not secure a conviction because they had failed to follow the procedure set 
out under the Act including specifically execution of the inventory of the seized goods, which 
would evince what was seized from the suspects.  
 
The Act prescribes various penalties under Section 35, of the Act including that a person 
convicted of counterfeiting is liable for a 5year imprisonment, or, in respect of each article/item 
involved in the particular act to which offence related a fine of not less than 3 times the retail 
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price, or both a custodial sentence and a fine. On second/ subsequent conviction, a person 
convicted is liable for a 15year imprisonment, or, in respect of each article/item involved in the 
particular act to which offence related a fine not less than 15 times the retail price or both.  It 
has been argued that the Anti-Counterfeit Act does not provide for a mandatory custodial 
sentence irrespective of the flagrancy of the counterfeiting offence neither does it provides for 
minimum penalties thus leaving a lot of discretion to the court.104 Such necessarily enables 
offenders to get off with light sentences.   
 
Section 27, of the Act empowers the Court to issue an Order of destruction where the seized 
goods are proven to be counterfeits. In Criminal Case No. 3268 of 2014; of Republic vs 
Ahmed Hassan the accused person, Ahmed Hassan was charged with 4 counts of having in 
possession, in the course of trade, counterfeit goods, contrary to section 32(a) and 35 (1) of the 
Anti-Counterfeit Act, 2008, Laws of Kenya. Though the goods were indeed found to be 
counterfeit, the accused person was acquitted on the basis that no linkage of ownership between 
the said counterfeit goods and the accused, was established. However, in determining the 
matter the court gave an order for the counterfeit goods to be destroyed in accordance with 
Section 28 (3) of the Anti-Counterfeit Act. Highlighting the ACA’s jurisdiction to counterfeit 
goods whether or not an accused person is convicted or acquitted. 
 
Also, the Act under Section 24 proscribes an offense of a person wilfully distracting or 
obstructing an ACA inspector from discharging his duties, and breaking of a seal or removal 
of documents sealed off by an inspector or detained at a counterfeit depot. 
 
Further, the Act enjoins the inspectors to respect the IPRs of ‘suspected counterfeiters’ under, 
Section 31 of the Act, by providing that, “a person commits an offence if any information with 
respect to any manufacturing process or trade secret obtained by him in premises which he has 
entered by virtue of powers of entry conferred on him under this Act; or, any information 
obtained by him in the performance of functions under this Act.” However, this section 
provides an exception where the disclosure was meant for the purposes of the performance of 
their duties under this Act.105 Essentially safeguarding that which is otherwise not illegal but 
still proprietary to the suspected counterfeiter. 
 
2.2.1(a) The Anti-Counterfeiting Regulations, 2010 
 
Established by virtue of Section 37 of the Anti-Counterfeiting Act under Legal Notice No. 126 
of 2010, these regulations are subsidiary regulations aimed at facilitating the enforcement of 
the provisions of the Act.106 They provide for formats for various forms against which the 
Authority’s mandate may be invoked, and also the applications obtaining including those of 
samples for use by intellectual property owners and the Agency. The Regulations help create 
specificity on the discharge of the ACA’s enforcement mandate. 
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Under Regulation 15, an owner of an intellectual property may submit particulars of the same 
to the Anti- Counterfeit Agency where the Agency maintains a database of the register.107 
Essentially creating an IPR register at ACA. This is significant to highlight since much as the 
registration might appear to create certainty on the enforcement by ACA easing verification of 
subsisting IPRs for the inspectors; these duplication exposes potential for conflict especially 
where the subject IPR has been challenged before the administering entity e.g. KIPI or even 
KECOBO but that the ACA has in its database the expunged, revoked or effluxed IPR as 
subsisting. 
 
Section 20 of the Regulations provides that the owner of suspected counterfeit goods who 
continues to deal or trade in goods of similar description, commits an offence and is liable upon 
conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or to a fine not exceeding six 
thousand shillings, or both. The regulations contain all the rules and procedure for handling 
counterfeit goods, throughout their provisions. 
The legal architecture under the Anti-Counterfeit Act is fairly robust, but the highlighted 
concerns on some of the provisions thereunder are necessarily posing a challenge to the 
enforcement of IPRs curbing counterfeiting of pharma-products in Kenya.  
 
2.2.2 The World Trade Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property (TRIPS) 
 
The Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation (WTO) contains as Annex 1C the 
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). The TRIPS 
Agreement came into force in 1996. Kenya, a founding member of the WTO was amongst the 
first countries to become as signatory to the Agreement, as early as 1995. This Agreement 
outlines the minimum standards of protection, member states are obliged to enact, concerning 
IP Rights in the form of copyrights, trademarks, patents, industrial designs, geographical 
indicators, integrated circuits and trade secrets.108 In assessing Kenya’s compliance with her 
obligations under TRIPS, regard must be had to the legal regime it has adopted (if at all) vis-
à-vis the obligations accruing under the minimum standards set-out under TRIPS. 
 
Article 61 of TRIPS which creates the obligation against which the Anti-Counterfeit Act, 2008 
was enacted provides as follows, ‘Members shall provide for criminal procedures and penalties 
to be applied at least in cases of willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a 
commercial scale. Remedies available shall include imprisonment and/or monetary fines 
sufficient to provide a deterrent, consistently with the level of penalties applied for crimes of a 
corresponding gravity. In appropriate cases, remedies available shall also include the seizure, 
forfeiture and destruction of the infringing goods and of any materials and implements the 
predominant use of which has been in the commission of the offence. Members may provide 
for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied in other cases of infringement of 
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intellectual property rights, in particular where they are committed willfully and on a 
commercial scale.’  
 
Indeed, TRIPS does not enjoin member states to criminalize and punish infringement of IPRs 
other than ‘the willful trademark counterfeit’ and ‘copyright piracy’ on ‘a commercial scale.’ 
So that even the obligations comes with qualifiers, such that if the intent of an infringer as 
being willful cannot be established or the counterfeiting not being at a commercial scale, then 
a law that proscribes to the contrary is TRIPS non-compliant. However, in including other IPRs 
within the scope of counterfeits as Kenya has done, the same is not violation of TRIPS it allows 
members discretion to so do, again with qualifiers on ‘willful counterfeiting’ and ‘commercial 
scale’ but in light of the challenge such a broad conceptualization causes on efficiency of 
enforcement and the direct threat it causes on right to health on access to medicine through 
generics there can be little value in over-compliance. 
 
Further under TRIPS, all member states are required to ensure that their national legislation 
reflects the provisions in the Agreement to ensure enforcement of the same. Specifically, on 
counterfeiting footnote 14 to Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement provides the following: 
"counterfeit trademark goods, shall mean any goods, including packaging, bearing without 
authorization a trademark which is identical to the trademark validly registered in respect of 
such goods, or which cannot be distinguished in its essential aspects from such a trademark, 
and which thereby infringes the rights of the owner of the trademark in question under the law 
of the country of importation;”  
 
Importantly trademark counterfeiting differs from trademark infringement, in light of the 
provisions of Article 61 as read with footnote 14, which the WTO advises is essential in 
understanding the acts, for which the penal sanctions apply. These would be ‘willful’, 
‘unauthorized user of a trademark’ and ‘at a commercial scale’.109 
 
This definition of counterfeit under TRIPS, not only excludes other IP rights obtaining in 
pharma such as patents, and limit the scope to trademarks; but also, TRIPS appears to observe 
the territoriality of IPRs. It additionally recognizes the protection of trademarks obtaining in 
the country of importation and not ‘elsewhere’. The Kenyan law measured against this TRIPS’ 
minimum standard is therefore said to be TRIPS++. The over compliance necessarily 
obfuscates enforcement by stretching the limited resources to enforce what is already exempt. 
 
Countries like the USA, which have a high level of patent protection have omitted patents from 
this conceptualisation, as permitted by TRIPS. In the USA criminal penalties are available for 
intentionally dealing in goods or services knowingly using a counterfeit mark.110 In explaining 
the cause of the variance, it is acknowledged that due to differences in enforcement rules in 
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different national legal systems and the difficulty to harmonise the enforcement rules; a 
compromise was struck to adopt a ‘result-oriented’ approach being to prevent infringement 
rather than agree on specific obligations. This lacuna created room for the TRIPS++ 
compliance. In any event it is acknowledged that the push for ‘consensus’ on essential elements 
of enforcement procedures, was bulldozed by the USA and EC reflecting views of their 
business community; with developing countries only just able to avoid obligation to establish 
specialised judicial system on enforcement.111 
 
2.2.3 Penal Code 
 
Further the Kenyan Penal Code112, also addresses itself to help curbing counterfeit pharma 
products. Specifically, under Section 243(e) and (f) the law criminalises counterfeiting of 
pharmaceutical products and provide thus: 
“Any person who, in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life or to be 
likely to cause harm to any other 
(e) gives medical or surgical treatment to any person whom he has 
undertaken to treat; or, 
(f) dispenses, supplies, sells, administers or gives away any medicine or 
poisonous or dangerous matter … is guilty of a misdemeanour.” 
 
This provision further avails additional proscription under the law, as against availing for sale 
counterfeit pharma. In curbing counterfeiting of pharma, the law enforcement agencies may 
adopt these provisions. 
 
2.2.4 Pharmacy & Poisons Act 
 
The Pharmacy & Poisons Act in its preamble has been described as, “an Act of Parliament to 
make better provision for the control of the profession of pharmacy and the trade in drugs and 
poisons.”113 Section 3 of the Act establishes the Pharmacy & Poisons Boards (PPB) whose 
functions include: assessing the nature and extent of counterfeit drugs,  strengthening the 
effectiveness of drug regulating authorities, the review and strengthening of legislation relating 
to pharmaceutical products as well strengthen enforcement in investigation, prosecution, 
conviction of  offences and collaboration at national, regional and international levels. It also 
trains staff on drug regulating authorities, customs and law enforcement agencies establish 
import procedures-designate specific ports of entry, quarantine for suspected drugs. 
 
A distinction however subsists on the quality of the product as well as pharmacovigilance vis-
à-vis whether or not such product is counterfeit. The considerations are varied and the 
counterfeit does not necessarily concern the quality or effects of pharmaceutical products, but 
rather the unauthorised user of the pharma-IPRs in a commercial context. As such the larger 
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mandate of the PPB on examination and testing is outside the ambit of this paper. In an 
interview with the Nation Newspaper on what the board was doing in the fight against pharma 
counterfeits, Dr. Fred Siyoi the then Director of the Pharmacy and Poisons Board said that the 
board was raising public awareness campaigns on counterfeit drugs, carrying our routine 
inspections as well as ensuring that all registered products were available on the board’s 
website and that products were thoroughly vetted and entry points for drugs gazetted.  He also 
noted that there was 24hour surveillance in borders as well as usage of the Raman Spectrometer 
which is a device used to screen drugs and can detect the counterfeits.  He also added that the 
board was collaborating with Interpol, the WHO on the fights against counterfeit medicines114 
Nonetheless in discharge of its role under Section 3 of the Act, the PPB has equally been 
engaged in combating counterfeit pharma. Dr Siyoi also reported that Kenyans would soon be 
able to use their mobile phones to identify whether the medicines they take are genuine through 
a short message code which was undergoing testing and set to be rolled out in mid-2019. 
Further, that the Board was working with software developers to create a unique code that will 
be used to identify the quality as well as track across the supply chain all medicines in the 
country — imported or locally manufactured115 
 
Although it has been reported that since 2016, PPB has closed more than 670 illegal 
pharmaceutical outlets across the country and consequently 612 persons arraigned in Court 
over operating illegal pharmacies, the Board has never published any of its reports in 
connection with its efforts on counterfeiting which raises a lot of speculation on how rampant 
is the situation  and whether at all actual progress is being made.116 It may well be an 
acknowledgment that such falls outside their ambit but more accurately their exercise of their 
mandate necessarily collects this data, which they ought to publish. 
 
2.2.4(a) Guidelines for Good Distribution Practices for 
Pharmaceuticals, 2006 
 
These guidelines were developed pursuant to the provisions of the Pharmacy and Poisons Act, 
to guide licensees on distribution of pharmaceuticals, both wholesale and retail.  The guidelines 
are meant to provide persons involved or wishing to be involved in pharmaceutical distribution 
with a method of assessing eligibility and the process of lawfully operating drug distribution 
outlets.117  
 
In particular, part 10 of these guidelines gives provisions for the handling of counterfeit goods. 
Its states that Products which are suspected to be counterfeit should be kept in a designated 
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area apart from other medicinal products to avoid confusion. It further states that they should 
be clearly labelled as “NOT FOR SALE”. Further the guidelines require the handler of the said 
goods to inform the Pharmacy and Poisons Board and the holder of the products registration.118 
 
2.2.5 The Kenya Revenue Authority Act, 1995 
 
This paper presumes that one of the biggest effects of counterfeiting and in this respect pharma 
counterfeiting is that it leads to great loss of revenue collection by the government. According 
to the Kenya Revenue Authority, counterfeiting costs the Government of Kenya shillings 6 
billion (about $ 84 million) in lost revenue annually.119 
 
The Kenya Revenue being Kenya’s taxman primarily discharges the function of revenue 
collection in Kenya as well as customs authorities play an important role in the fight against 
counterfeit and pirated products. Counterfeiters take advantage of countries where there are 
weak enforcements and laws on intellectual property as their haven for production. They then 
export the goods produced to countries where there is a high demand for the goods and this has 
necessitated border measures in the fight against counterfeiting.120 
 
Therefore, the Kenya Revenue Authority plays a crucial role to this extent noting that over the 
years there has been a global increase in cross border trade. Customs officers can seize and 
destroy goods that are prohibited goods, either under the Customs Act, or which are illegal 
under any other Act, which makes them prohibited under Customs.121 
 
The Anti-Counterfeit Act afore-discussed vests certain shared mandates with the 
Commissioner for customs (an office stablished under the Kenya Revenue Authority Act No 
2of 1995) on seizure of counterfeit products at points of entry. 
 
2.2.6 East African Community Competition Act, 2006 
 
This Act was established to promote and protect fair competition in the East African 
Community which comprises of seven member states, to provide for consumer welfare, to 
establish the East African Community Competition Authority and for related matters. Some 
amendments were made in this Act to allow for the protection of Trademarks and copyrights 
only but not patents.122 Significantly one of the amendments provides that its provisions shall 
not be construed as prohibiting the manufacture, importation, sale or dealing in medicinal 
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products generally known as generic medicines, provided that such medicines are not 
counterfeit goods.123 
 
Reference to this law is important as a major concern that must be borne in effectively 
addressing the fight on counterfeit pharma, is the cross-border nature of this illicit trade. 
Regional measures would certainly be integral in effectively addressing the issue. 
 
2.2.7 East African Common Market Protocol 
 
This Protocol was established pursuant to the provisions of articles 76 and 104 of the treaty for 
the establishment of the East African Community and came into force in the year 2010.124 
Under Article 35 (1) of the Protocol, partner states are bound to ensure that they promote then 
interests of the members of the Community by ensuring protection of life, health and safety of 
consumers. Sub-article 2 of the same Article compels states to ensure that they encourage fair 
and effective competition in order to provide consumers with greater choices in goods at the 
lowest prices. 
 
Under Article 43 (1), partner states are bound to co-operate in the protection of intellectual 
property rights through promotion and promotion of creativity for economic, technological and 
socio-cultural development in the community. More specifically, Article 43(2)(c) partner states 
agree to cooperate in piracy and counterfeit activities. 
 
 2.3 Conclusion 
 
A discussion of the above laws, evinces that indeed Kenya does have an established legal 
framework on enforcement of counterfeiting. However, the existence of this legal regime, 
whilst laudable does not equate to an effective enforcement regime. The ineffective 
enforcement of IP, exposes millions to risk of death through failure to protect public health,125 
but also critically serves to disincentive investment into the pharma-industry which is often 
costs not just through the R&D, clinical trials and regulatory approvals but also the marketing 
costs.  
 
In this respect, and informed by the discussions above the current legal framework on curbing 
pharma-counterfeiting is inadequate negating the value-add from the creation/registration of 
the IPRs. This paper considers the consequence of these inadequacies in the next chapter, and 
it will ultimately recommend redress measures in its concluding chapter. 
 
The primary legislation within the Kenyan legal regime on combating counterfeits is the Anti-
Counterfeit Act, 2008; which in its enactment must be minded by the minimums required of 
the country under the TRIPS without unduly encumbering Trade in pharma or worse still 
                                                          
123 <https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2015d6_en.pdf>accessed 14 April 2019. 
124 < http://eacj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Common-Market-Protocol.pdf> accessed 13 March 2019 
125 Sell S, The Global IP Upward Ratchet, Anti-counterfeiting and Piracy Enforcement Efforts, 20 
39 
 
encumber the actualization of the right to health. It is noteworthy that Kenya enacted Statute 
Law (miscellaneous amendment), No 18 of 2018 which law inter alia amended the Anti-
Counterfeit law, to better enhance the enforcement measures, redefining the enforcement 
organs and adding onto the power of the ACA including enhancing its capacity as a government 
authority as opposed to an agency, which also increases their budgetary allocation with a direct 
impact on ability to actualize programmes. 
 
The preceding discussion on the various laws obtaining in Kenya, enacted variously to curb 
the proliferation of counterfeit pharmaceuticals evinces that Kenya does not have a limitation 
of legal enactments geared at fighting counterfeit pharma. The discussion however, also 
importantly highlights the significant limitations posed by these laws on the efficacy of the 


































3.0 Chapter Three: The Effect of Ineffective Enforcement against 
Counterfeits on the Growth of the Pharmaceutical 
Industry in Kenya 
 
3.1 A Review of Data and Statistics on Counterfeiting 
 
According to the WHO trade in counterfeit medicine rake sin an average of $100 Million 
annually. With the bulk of these being destined and/or otherwise trans-shipped through Africa, 
and the Port of Mombasa in particular ranked by the UN as a major hub.126 Worse still the 
drugs targeted concern medicines for serious ailments, perceivably due to the high costs of the 
genuine product, unavailability or just plain old-ignorance by the consumers. The WCO in the 
report by Ms Murumba note that, “13 million illicit and potentially dangerous pharmaceutical 
products, over 12 million (12,509,823) units were netted at the Mombasa seaport alone.”127 
Quite patently Mombasa and Kenya appears to be a soft target, which must pose questions as 
to the efficacy of the regimes that we have in place to respond to the challenge. 
 
The number of seizures made in the four operations between 2012 and 2017 reached almost 
900 million counterfeit and illicit medicines worth about €400 million (Sh46.2billion), so much 
so that there is a clear financial impact of the illicit trade, globally but particularly in Kenya 
and the East African region.128 But worse still so many lives are lost on account of this trade, 
WHO estimates that, “… 700,000 people are killed globally by counterfeit medicines annually. 
Africa contributes 100,000 of these deaths.” Presumably, Kenya contributes a significant 
number to these deaths noting from the volume of the seizures netted in Kenya.  
 
The WHO also notes that the everyday medicine is particularly targeted but brazenly also, the 
counterfeiters have worked their nets into lifesaving medicines for ailments such as cancer, 
HIV/AIDS, cardiovascular and diabetic conditions129– without a care. The WHO quotes the 
Interpol whilst issuing a caveat as to unavailability of enough accurate data on the level of 
counterfeit medicine, it reports that not less than 50% of the medicines purchased online are 
counterfeit. Most of which funds finance criminal networks and deprive governments of much 
needed revenue to provide public service.130 
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In his 2012 e-publication Jack’s 2012 Faking It131, he studied the scale of proliferation in 
counterfeit medicine in Kenya, and the observation that reportedly HIV patients in Kenya are 
affected by Counterfeit ARVs. Vepachedu further highlights the health complications brought 
about by counterfeit anti-bacterials and highlights that there is an increase in antimicrobial 
resistance (AMR). The WHO attribute the proliferation in counterfeit medicines to the spread 
of ARM. The WHO estimates that antimicrobial resistance (AMR) could kill 10 million people 
per year by 205. Counterfeit medicines have the wrong amount of an active ingredient, none at 
all, or a different one all of which catalyse the resistance against various pharmaceutical 
regimes.132   
 
Counterfeit medicine is not a uniquely Kenyan (or African challenge) according to the WCO, 
‘… counterfeit medicines are on the rise, and cost the EU pharmaceutical industry €10.2 billion 
(US $12.4 billion) a year in lost sales, according to a European Union Intellectual Property 
Office report with an increased use of e-commerce by the counterfeiters coupled with the 
difficulty of tracing the source of those selling via these platforms.”133 As such curbing the 
menace must have extra-territorial mechanisms including addressing the online marketplace. 
 
The data considered herein though sounds alarmingly high, experts say it barely accurately 
captures the full extent, and that supposedly the same is a scratch on the surface of an otherwise 
organised criminal network. 
 
The KBS National Economic Survey, 2019 Report, reporting on the quantity and value of 
imports and exports of pharmaceutical products over the last five years, evinces a difference of 
almost 15,000 metric tonnes between the value in imports and exports. The report also captures 
that the value of imports form India rose from KES 170.4 Billion in 2017 to KES 185.3 Billion 
in 2018, also evincing a fairly heavy reliance on pharma imports particularly from India. 
 
The data is undeniable as it loudly exposes the size of the problem, counterfeiting certainly not 
only rakes in tremendously from the illicit trade, but it also denies genuine pharma businesses 
a fair return on their proprietary rights, and denies governments revenue. Worse still, with this 
massive scale of illicit trade the significant health risk/exposure for the consumers of the 
counterfeit pharma is equally disturbingly high.  
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The ICC, urges that this unabated escalation of the illicit trade has a domino effect outside the 
obvious infringement and violation of proprietary rights.134 It cautions that this illicit trade will 
lead to closure of pharma business, consequent unemployment, availability for funding for 
organized crime and ultimately possible brake down of law of order. The losses sustained by 
industry will equally be reflected in losses to the public revenue. 
 
Sell however disputes the startling data on proliferation levels, she cautions that the evidence 
of counterfeit drugs is anecdotal rather than empirical. This is because the only global 
collection point for the ‘raw’ data on counterfeit drugs is the Pharmaceutical Security Institute 
– constituting 14 global drug companies, who never release such data publicly.135 She decries 
that the limited data is one sided and, of course, favour the rights holders. 
 
3.2 Pharma-Counterfeiting, and the Growth of Genuine Pharma-Industry 
 
As a preliminary, it this paper’s argument that intellectual property and particularly responsive 
enforcement of intellectual property necessarily positively impacts trade (both domestic and 
international), licit competition, manufacturing and industrial growth and ultimately socio-
economic development.136 Without an apt anti-counterfeiting legal system then the 
consequence is a stunted and receding growth of the genuine pharma industry, as well as a 
dereliction of the duty to safeguard patients’ right to access healthcare. Further, a report 
published by a taskforce established under Kenya’s MoH137 rightly notes that, Counterfeit-
pharma are a major problem globally and Kenya is equally fair-game. It cautions on the major 
adverse impact the counterfeits have on public health. They worrisomely add that it is a lot 
worse and the problem even more pronounced in a situation where the manufacture, 
importation, distribution, supply and sell of medicines are less regulated and enforcement 
mechanism is weak. 
 
Luccini reports that, “The predicted growth in the global pharma-market between 2012 and 
2021 is estimated at 26%, (according to PROPARCO’s SP & D publication), but the African 
drug market could increase by 200% according to a realistic assumption, or by 300% 
according to an optimistic hypothesis within this same period. Based on African Pharma-
Market Report of Frost and Sullivan of 2016, the pharma-market in Africa is expected to reach 
a business opportunity of $45 billion in 2020. Goldstein Research analyst forecast the Africa 
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pharma-market size is set to reach USD 160.7 billion by 2024, at a CAGR of 20.4% over the 
forecast years.”138 Staggering business prospects. 
 
Contemporaneous thereto, is the report by the WHO that proportional contribution of Non-
Communicable Diseases (NCD) to the healthcare burden in Africa will rise by 21% through 
2030. Luccini’s report also highlights that, “the tropical climate of Africa makes the continent 
the largest reservoir of infectious diseases, particularly malaria, tuberculosis (TB), and 
acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), besides frequent outbreaks of polio, 
meningitis, cholera, pandemic influenza, yellow fever, measles, hepatitis, and tetanus. With the 
increasing adoption of Western lifestyle in Africa, there has been a paradigm shift in the 
burden of illness towards non-communicable diseases (NCDs), driving the demand for 
chronic prescription drugs.”139 On the strength of these reports then in terms of growth, it is 
projected that the global and African pharma markets are positioned on a growth trajectory. 
However how is Kenya’s anti-counterfeiting legal system positioning it to reap from this 
prediction. Undeniably there is an increase in the chronic illness as reported by Lucchini, but 
also the tropical illness have far too long raved its citizen’s. Wouldn’t a responsive review of 
the enforcement against counterfeiting increase the drive to establish a more robust pharma-
industry for Kenya or is the current regime responsive enough.  
 
Dent records that, proponents of stricter IP legal system, (such as the approach seemingly 
adopted by Kenya) urge that IP must be protected at all costs. But even more centrally, these 
proponents urge that without strong IP protection innovative products would no longer be made 
or availed to the greater ‘publics.’140 Dent also acknowledges that counterfeiters set-out, “to 
make the product or service look like an original, whether to fool consumers into buying it, or 
to allow the consumer to fool others into thinking that they bought the real deal.”141  
 
3.2.1 Drivers of Counterfeiting, and their effect on Growth of Pharma-
Industry 
  
An interesting exposition from Dent is that he helps identify a useful key dichotomy in drivers 
of counterfeit with reference to the complicit consumer of the one hand, and the unscrupulous 
merchant of the other. Such that in understanding the specificities of what drives pharma-
counterfeits it must be critiqued from the spectrum of these two classes.  
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The success of counterfeit trade is structured of the one hand ‘consumer accomplices’ who 
knowingly set-out to and proceed to purchase counterfeits: and contemporaneously ‘illicit 
merchants’ who knowingly put up for sale counterfeit products either for varied premises. 
Sihanya cites that Kenyans reportedly prefer counterfeit products due to their general 
affordability, that allows access to goods the preserve of middle and upper classes.142 
 
Blosh, Peter H et al explores this demand side of the counterfeiting spectra, and introduces the 
term Consumer Accomplices in product counterfeiting. He notes that some consumers are 
complicit – knowingly purchasing/creating a market for counterfeits. This lending credence to 
the premise for segregation of counterfeit drivers, in developing an apt understanding of the 
counterfeiting problem. In enhancing efficacy of fight against counterfeits, adequate concern 
must be directed at redressing the segregated driver of consumer complicity, of the one part. 
 
Differing from Dent, Blosh et al urge that the consumer accomplices are drawn to counterfeits 
on account of the availability of the counterfeits i.e. the counterfeits are better distributed and 
more readily available than the genuine products. But even more particularly, Blosh et al 
observe that the counterfeits are often better priced than the genuine products. As afore-cited 
in this paper, these consumer accomplices drive counterfeiting on account of their comparative 
affordability, convenience and accessibility and availability.143 Nayarah Siva similarly urges144 
that the often prohibitive costs of genuine pharma-products fuels the growth of counterfeit-
pharma. He cautions that counterfeiters are extremely flexible in their approaches, making their 
dangerous products readily available to the unwitting consumers. Nonetheless it is Siva’s view 
that effective anti-counterfeit measures will lower the costs of genuine pharma-products.  
 
A United Nation’s 2016 report145 similarly, notes that the prices for genuine medicines in 
Kenya and the East African Community, are often out of reach for developing countries' public 
health systems. Critically the UN notes that this high prices largely accrue due to the IPRs held 
over these drugs, which IPRs exclude access, and competition from reasonably priced generics. 
Indeed even the Doha talks, acknowledged the impact IPR protection has on potentially 
lessening access and affordability of medicines but also acknowledged importance of IPR in 
incentivising R&D into new medicines.146 The architecture of the legal system which protects 
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IPRs in pharma-products, therefore must be minded to balance the three converging interests 
of intellectual property rights holder, competition and consumer protection.  
 
Blakeney equally addresses the consumer accomplice phenomena, by observing that 
counterfeiting would actually be non-existent without the consumer demand for the 
counterfeits, and the misconception of counterfeiting as not crimes per se but innocuous 
infractions.147 Blakeney identifies the conceptualisation of what amounts to counterfeits are in 
the eyes of the law as a factor in the growth of counterfeit in pharma. 
 
The other spectra of the first limb espoused in Dent’s exposition is the supply-side from the 
illicit merchants who seek to cash in on trying to make their products look real. Their 
motivation is a lot more uncomplicated with focus being to simply ride on the good will of the 
better known branded products. Profit motivation is quite simply the driver on this limb.  
 
The second core driver of counterfeiting, as evinced in Dent’s exposition is the challenge of 
wilful infringement by illicit merchants who focus on the look or resemblance to the 
real/genuine. Underscoring the need for protection of trademarks in curbing counterfeiting. 
Dent criticizes what he describes as an attempt by certain players to reap maximum possible 
from anti-counterfeiting measures, by seeking to unify IP violations under one rubric. He 
importantly cautions that this unification threatens even perfectly legal generic drugs into the 
ambit of counterfeit. He urges that, “…(unification) grouping tactics are also frequently useful 
in persuading local law enforcement agencies to police the strict rules that are so often on the 
books, even in developing economies where such policing is potentially counterproductive”.148 
 
Sell, equally raises a similar concern by cautioning against the ‘IP Maximalists’ out to assert 
rights without obligations, using the TRIPs obligations as the floor and not ceiling. There is an 
apparent attempt to drive broader, wider and higher IPR protection through a global anti-
counterfeiting initiative. Sell cautions that most developing countries adopt TRIPs plus plus 
measures, unwarrantedly self-imposing much higher levels of protection which have the effect 
of negating access to health. Importantly, the broadened conceptualisation of counterfeits and 
failure to limit pharma-counterfeits to those wilfully infringing on trademark rights, 
unwittingly criminalises behaviour that is otherwise legal including compulsory licensing, 
parallel importation and generics.149  
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Parallel importation involves the sale of pharma-products that are often genuine, often identical 
to legitimate products except that they may be packaged differently and may not carry the 
original manufacturer’s warranty. Parallel importation involves importation of goods from 
countries of manufacture of first sale, usually without authority of IPR owner. The trade in 
generics is an off-shoot of parallel importation as reproduction of drugs is much cheaper than 
actually researching on and developing or manufacturing the first unit.150 Article 6 of TRIPS 
defers regulation of parallel imports to national laws, allowing member states to align their IPR 
enforcement legal system against counterfeits to the reasonable treatment of generics. A 
broadened conceptualisation of counterfeits may unduly extend to parallel exports. 
 
Part III of the TRIPs agreement, enjoins the member states to establish border measures and 
criminal sanctions that are binding in relation to Trademarks and Copyright only, though 
members would retain discretion for higher levels of protection and extension to other IPRs.151 
Such that criminal sanctions exposed through anti-counterfeiting laws are only mandatory, in 
response to wilful trademark counterfeiting.152 The TRIPS expressly excludes through 
admissible exceptions,153 including compulsory licensing from conceptualisation as 
counterfeit, recognising need for a tapered approach to not unduly negate right to health 
erstwhile promoting innovation and licit trade. Sell urges for a need for clarity and defined 
scoping through apt terminology to distinguish and create rules that do not criminalise pharma-
products lawfully produced under TRIPS compliant rules including grey goods and generics.154 
 
Indeed, this exposition highlights the limitation posed on curbing counterfeiting as a result of 
an inefficacious approach through a broadened conceptualisation of counterfeits. If Kenya’s 
approaches are not localized, and continue imposing IP maximalist approaches, would be ill-
suited to curbing the growth of pharma-counterfeit. 
 
Abdul Sattar and Tahir Mahmod, undertook an extensive review of empirical studies critiquing 
the impact (if any) of IPR Protection and economic development. Against the background of 
the effect of enhanced IPR protection in Pakistan, they urge that effective protection of IPR 
necessarily bring about greater innovation, with an assured return on the research and 
development for the innovators and a direct consequence on socio-economic development. 
This is because the innovators are assured of an opportunity to recoup from their innovation. 
Importantly they highlight that countries at lower levels of development coincidentally have 
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weaker forms of IPR protection, whereas high income (developed) countries have stronger IPR 
protection regimes.155 Against a legal regime assuring of return on investment, incentives 
accrue to employ resources in the endeavour of innovation.  
 
Sattar and Mahmood considered the impact of recognition and enforcement of IPRs, on 
economic growth from a sample of thirty-eight (38) countries categorized at different levels of 
development including 11, high income countries; 16, middle income countries; and 11, low 
income countries, over the period of thirty years i.e. from 1975-2005 by utilizing Ginarte and 
Park Index of Intellectual Property Rights (2005). The overwhelming conclusion over this 
study is that IPR recognition and protection plays a significant role in economic development. 
They however qualify this by observing that for developed and developing countries the impact 
is a lot more apparent than for least developed countries. This may be attributable to the oft 
unenforced or non-existent IPR regimes in the lower spectrum of developed vis-à-vis 
developing countries. Sihanya acknowledging the nexus between IP and levels of development 
notes that undeveloped or weak IP legal systems are usually a consequence of the level of 
industrial development. This he explains by noting that as a natural path, undeveloped 
economies encourage liberal access to foreign IPRs but as the domestic industries grow and 
generate their own IPRs, these industries lobby for stronger protection from their governments, 
and ultimately the level of protection is enhanced.156 
 
On an extensive empirical review of the nexus between IPR protection and economic 
development Ginarte  and Park (1997) have developed an index of 110 countries,157 being an 
un-weighted index of five separate scores focusing on first, coverage i.e. the scope of protection 
available in a particular country; second, membership in international treaties; third, duration 
of protection (and or validity period of protection); fourth, enforcement mechanisms; and fifth, 
restrictions imposed including compulsory licensing inter alia.158 The study by Ginarte and 
Park, (updated in 2005) while focusing on patents, importantly established inter alia that the 
developed countries have stronger protection of IPRs which often translates to a long term 
stimulus to production. Further this research established that developing countries often have 
a low level of research coupled with disinterest in enforcement of intellectual property rights 
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from these governments; essentially that low research levels de-incentivized protection and 
enforcement of IPRs. 
 
In adopting effective IPR protection, the study by Sattar and Mahmood similarly evinces that 
the developed economies are incentivized to enhance the level of protection on account of the 
innovative capacities in these countries but also the market size targeted for the exploitation of 
their protected IPRs. So that, it is cyclic that the IPR protection almost self-incentivizes i.e. the 
benefit of enhancing protection is more real as the actual protection is accorded.  
 
Sell retorts that there is a deliberate ‘use of misleading data and rhetoric’ and hyperbolic 
equation of counterfeiting to human, drugs and small arms trafficking as well as black market 
trade in nuclear. She urges that this is used by industry lobbyist to push for IP maximalist laws 
and rive higher prices and profits for pharma-business.  
 
Contemporaneously, in isolating the effects of illicit trade, it is urged that apt enforcement 
against counterfeits may not have any impact of the growth of pharma industry and industry 
generally. Sell notes that high production costs absent subsidies may still hamper growth. 
Sikoyo G et al note159 that use of apt IPR enforcement may be used to incentivize innovation 
and invention, as it avails a mechanism for market protection. The bigger pharma business with 
years and massive investments in R&D can exploit this protection, perhaps at great costs to 
locals who may be unable to afford the only genuine available pharma product.  
 
Sikoyo G, et al, similarly observe that strengthened IPR protection will disenfranchise its use 
for technological innovation, and the costs of accessing the IPRs and/or emerging technologies 
connected thereto will increase, and as such the growth of the pharma industry will be curtailed.  
 
A permissive environment for counterfeits through supposed as convenient for developing 
economies, may indeed result to short-term gains including ease access to and transfer of 
technology and pharma-products that were otherwise out of reach, possibly increase business 
opportunities, create employment or even save forex that would have been spent on importing 
the technology and have this funds applied elsewhere: but long term the losses are massive.160 
The huge negative effects have been highlighted elsewhere in this paper. Sihanya cautions that 
in addition to the negative effects which outweigh the fallacious benefits of a permissive 
environment; these short term gains fails to incentivise endogenous technological capability, 
fails to nature an IP culture and respect for endogenous culture and in any event the most 
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favoured principle and national treatment principles under TRIPS negate any legality of a 
conscientiously weak IP system.161   
 
Ginarte and Park observe that, in isolation of an enabling micro and macro-economic 
architecture, IP protection solely cannot create the conducive environment necessary for 
innovation and production to thrive. This observation is against their study’s finding that apt 
protection of IPRs necessarily co-hears with presence of a critical size of the research sector. 
Maskus correctly equally cautions from an economist’s perspective, that stronger IPR 
protection in isolation will not improve prospects of economic growth and development.162 He 
rightly argues that there is need to activate an array of other influences including development 
of robust macro and micro economic policies on taxation, support for literary and technological 
education, openness to international trade and investment of the one part and embedding IP 
systems within coherent socio-economic policies and transparent regulation of the other.   
 
Dent163 highlights the scepticism on utility of a rigorous enforcement of IPRs, including 
unyielding anti-counterfeit regimes, in developing economies. Indeed, some scholars have 
sought to advance an epistemological thought, to the effect that it is imprudent for developing 
economies to adopt these anti-counterfeiting regimes especially on account of their effect of 
the realization of the right to health,164 which in Kenya is constitutionally enshrined.165 
 
To address these concerns, first, regard must be had to their consistent concurrence that in 
isolation of other facilitators such as responsive taxation regimes, other enablers of production 
and a functioning rule of law; IPR protection would certainly have little to no impact in 
incentivising innovation and investment in the pharma-industry. Further, the concerns against 
IPR protection, are mitigated by the availability of TRIPS flexibilities to member states in their 
national interest. So much so, that it is not a debate on whether or not to have IPR protection 
but how to make use of the flexibilities and have a sui generis regime responsive to Kenya. 
 
These flexibilities are available to cure the challenge of access, and in fact the UN urges that 
these flexibilities are available to incentivize investment (including foreign investment) in local 
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pharmaceutical production. A taskforce by the Kenyan Ministry of Health166, established to 
address parallel importation, counterfeits and illegal trade in pharmaceutical products, similarly 
conducted a study and established that indeed TRIPS - which enjoins member states to protect 
IPRs within their jurisdictions – has entrenched flexibilities which create exceptions and 
limitations on an IPR owners exclusive rights; and these exceptions and limitations properly 
used can adequately redress the challenge apprehended on a regime for the creation, and apt 
protection of IPRs over pharmaceutical products.  
 
Ill-advisedly Kenya’s approach especially in a far as scoping is concerned currently appears to 
have focused on adopting as broad as scope as possible; this has a direct impact on the capacity 
technical and administrative to enforce but also more importantly unnecessarily encumber what 
would otherwise be licit pharma-products. There is also a seemingly deliberate omission on the 
challenges faced by prevalence and proliferation of technology and e-commerce. The premise 
of availing protection for IPRs especially within the pharma industry being clear, from the 
preceding discussions not least because of the negative impact absent protection would cause.  
 
But additionally, and particularly important for Kenya a report by the British Council in Kenya 
established167 that as at 2017, 22% of Kenyan youth were unemployed, with an average of a 
staggering 500,000 to 800,000 entering the job market annually. This is against a youth 
population of approximately 10 million, averaging 20% of her total population. To mitigate 
these alarming statistics the country ought to conscientiously avail opportunities for paying 
employment, or other ways of gaining personal economic independence. The pharma industry 
is one key sector that could be leveraged with appropriate interventions, and this paper argues, 
including apt enforcement of intellectual property rights within the pharma-industry.  
 
A projected direct consequence of the much publicized “Jubilee big 4 Agenda” championed as 
the pillars of president Kenyatta’s legacy is the creation of 1.3 Million jobs in the 
manufacturing sector.168 These employment opportunities can be achieved through both 
gainful employment and self-employment. Mwangi, the Executive Secretary of the Kenya 
Association of Pharmaceutical Importers (KAPI) – a Kenyan lobby group by pharmaceutical 
companies who research, develop, manufacture and bring to market novel (new) drugs - notes 
that Kenya has the largest pharmaceutical market in the EAC, estimated to be worth 75 billion 
Kenya Shillings in 2014. But even more importantly she notes that the, “world’s top 10 
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pharmaceutical companies (with a combined revenue of about $330 billion in 2017) through 
representations, local affiliates and distributors, buttresses the country’s attractiveness for 
investment.”169 With the correct regime supporting the pharma sector these figures can be 
bettered, for Kenya’s benefit. 
 
3.3 Core challenges reposed in Kenya’s current anti-counterfeit legal regime 
 
This study had under chapter two above, critiqued the primary legal regime currently actuated 
in Kenya to combat counterfeit in pharma: having discussed the causal effect of counterfeits 
on the growth of country’s pharma industry; this chapter concludes with a discussion 
highlighting three (3) core challenges identified as most impacting Kenya’s anti-counterfeit 
regime and consequently limiting the growth of the country’s pharma industry. The World 
Health Organization (WHO) in urging for enactment for responsive legal regimes, further 
cautions through the guidelines for the Development of Measures to Combat Counterfeit drugs, 
under the Department of Essential Drugs and other Medicines, that the counterfeiting problem 
is “more pronounced in countries where the manufacture, importation, distribution, supply, and 
sale of drugs are less regulated and the enforcement is weak.”170 
 
3.3.1 Conceptualisation and scoping of what is counterfeit under Kenyan Law 
 
The First challenge discerned in this study, is the concern accruing from the definition of what 
is counterfeit, and the consequent implausible scope for effective enforcement that this 
broadened definition creates. The Anti-Counterfeit Act, 2008 defines counterfeit as: 
“counterfeiting, means taking the following actions without the authority of the owner 
of intellectual property right subsisting in Kenya or outside Kenya in respect of 
protected goods…” (emphasis added)171 
 
This definition creates the broad scope of what is counterfeited to include IPRs registered in 
Kenya’s and those that have not. Traditionally, IPR owners enjoy exclusive rights over their 
IPRs within countries where such right has been recognized in law. Indeed, Kenya has enacted 
various IP statutes recognizing various IPRs including the Copyright Act172 recognizing 
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copyrights, and for registrable rights the Trademarks Act173, recognizing on trademarks, the 
Seeds and Plant Varieties Act174 recognizing Plant varieties and the Industrial Property Act175, 
recognizing patents and petty patents. The Anti-Counterfeit Act is neither a recognition nor 
registration statute, this is vested elsewhere. It is solely meant to, ‘prohibit trade in counterfeit 
goods, to establish the Anti-Counterfeit Agency, and for connected purposes.’176 However 
under the 2018 amendments the law allows the ACA to establish a customs recordal for 
trademarks – in addition to the registration of trademarks under the Trademarks Act.  
 
Seemingly however, the definition accords the ACA authority to enforce that which the 
establishing recognition and registration statutes do not permit: ofcourse minded of any 
reciprocity agreements that would extend comity. This proposition violates a fundamental 
principle on territoriality of IPRs and the enforceability of an IPR in a jurisdiction where such 
right is recognized. This definition was previously declared unconstitutional and struck out by 
the Kenyan High Court, but the National Assembly seemingly ignored the substantive 
questions posed by the Court with regard to the effect on the right to health actualized by access 
to generics, in its judgment in Patricia Asero Ochieng, Maurine Atieno and Joseph Munyi v 
The Republic, 2012.177 The UNCTAD had noted178 that the 2008 Act, could be easily 
misunderstood and misinterpreted by the Court, resulting in the application of criminal 
sanctions to cases of potential patent infringement that occurs in the context of generic 
activities. 
 
It is noteworthy that the Act sets out a particular scope in reference to medicine or 
pharmaceutical products in further defining the scope of counterfeits thus, 
“…in relation to medicine, (counterfeiting means) the deliberate and fraudulent 
mislabelling of medicine with respect to identity or source, whether or not such 
products have correct ingredients, wrong ingredients, have sufficient active ingredients 
or have fake packaging.” 
 
The focus in this definition quite patently does not seek to address substandard medicines, in 
so far as the medicines may have deficiencies in quality, efficacy or safety. Which deficiency 
raises significant public health questions, perhaps rightly so as this is not an IP question, but 
looking at the dire consequences the superficial reference to serious concerns that would 
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require substantive consideration and redress appear unaddressed. However, product quality is 
not the focus of this study.  
 
A different concern on scoping is the extension of anti-counterfeiting to all IPRs, and not just 
limited to trademarks and/or copyrights and related rights. Such that under Kenyan Law, all 
IPRs including patents, plant varieties are all subject of anti-counterfeiting law. The practicality 
of enforcing some of this IPRs, which would often require some considerable effort in time 
and technical competence in examining negates the effort of the enforcement.  
 
This peculiar change under Kenya’s Anti-counterfeit regime is a significant departure from the 
standards under TRIPs,179 which anticipates application of anti-counterfeit laws to trademarks 
and copyright and related. Importantly TRIPS only prescribes minimums and Kenya is at 
liberty to enhance the level of protection; but where such “enhancements” have a deleterious 
on not just international trade but the very growth of industry in the country, then such supposed 
enhancements ought to be voided.  
 
Most certainly, the extended scoping of counterfeits under Kenyan law goes contrary to the 
establishment of an effective enforcement regime, unnecessarily exposing the work at the ACA 
to challenge for want of legal plausibility and certainty. Anyangu-Amu (in writing about the 
2008 Act, which the country has reverted to vide 2018 amendments to the law) notes that 
Kenya’s broad conceptualisation creates confusion between counterfeits and generics. This 
broad scoping disregards the premise of limiting counterfeiting action to Trademark 
counterfeiting and copyright piracy, both of which are easily identifiable visually.180 
 
Additionally, ‘unlike trademarks or copyright patent infringement cannot be established 
without expert investigations including determination whether there is ‘equivalence’ or not.’181 
Countries with high level of patent protection omit patent rights from scope of counterfeits, 
importantly because with such a broadened scope we’ll have enforcement officials trying to 
figure out whether drugs are counterfeit or not increasing risks of seizure and lawful products 
being labelled fake, as well as delays at entry points on verifications and also unnecessarily 
attracting costs to disprove ‘fakeness’ ultimately increasing per-unit costs for the affordable 
medicine.182 The expertise to detect such lies with the Pharmacy and Poisons Board (PPB) 
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which in law already is required to authenticate medicinal potency and safety of pharma-
products imported into Kenya.  
 
3.3.2 Inadequate capacity of the enforcement agencies 
 
Secondly, the Kenya Association of Manufacturers has decried the limited number of 
enforcement officers at the ACA, available to undertake the wide ranging detection, 
investigations, seizures and possible subsequent prosecution.183 Sihanya highlights that the 
ACA though critical in fight against counterfeits, is characterised by an insufficient and 
untrained human resource unable to manage the volume and complexity, evincing general and 
technical ignorance.184 The ACA being a state agency tasked with the mandate to enforce 
against counterfeits having such limited numbers, can obviously do very little impactful work: 
this is because the concerned officers would be stretched too thin to meaningfully discharge 
their mandate. The Act to cure this challenge provides that the ACA works in collaboration185 
with the designated anti-counterfeit inspectors who include member of the ACA Board, 
National Police Service officers, authorised customs officer, trade development officer, 
industrial development officer, trade mark and patent examiner, seed and plant inspector, 
public health inspector, and inspectors appointed under the Standards Act (Cap. 496), the 
Weights and Measures Act (Cap. 513), the Copyright Act (No. 12 of 2001), the Food, Drugs 
and Chemical Substances Act (Cap. 254), the Pharmacy and Poisons Act (Cap. 244) and the 
Pest Control Products Act (Cap. 346).186 
 
This challenge is even more real, as read with the broad scope of what the ACA is currently 
legally empowered to enforce. The current scope of what the ACA can enforce including IPRs 
such as Patents, protected Plant Varieties, Utility Models registered in Kenya and elsewhere; 
the technical competence required to effectively enforce these more intricate IPRs certainly 
undermines the apt enforcement of IPRs.  This challenge appears to, almost in equal measure 
tease counterfeiters and mock IPR owners as it grants a virtually unenforceable right and at 
best exposes this power to possible abuse. Due regard is required in ensuring that the 
enforcement agencies are adequately capacitated to enable it effectively discharge its mandate.  
Sihanya notes that efficiency in the anti-counterfeiting legal system extends to capacity 
challenge in monitoring border measures and also limited expertise in practitioners, 
administrators and judicial officers.187 He however highlights that having contrasted law 
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enforcement in 1990 and 2005, a stack similarity on inability to distinguish fake from genuine 
is a major concern. He also highlights ‘rent-seeking’ corruption and complicity as part of 
influencers for inefficiency amongst law enforcement – which can be cured and/or mitigated 
through adequate incentives such as better terms and conditions of service.188 
 
The government has itself acknowledged this limitation and in seeking to curb counterfeiting, 
established a Multi-Agency Task Force under the Executive Office of the President led by 
Wanyama Mutsiambo, the Deputy Head of Public Service. This task force includes 
representation from the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Cooperatives, State Department for 
Trade; the Kenya Revenue Authority, the Kenya Copyright Board, Pest-Control Products 
Board, the Anti-counterfeit authority, the Attorney General’s Office, the Kenya Bureau of 
Standards, and the Pharmacy and Poisons Board. The establishment of the taskforce was in 
recognition of the need to collate and leverage the efforts of these various agencies and their 
technical expertise. It is however important to entrench such an initiative in law to define their 
mandate and power. But even with this enhanced capacity, technology makes it even more 
difficult for the already technically challenged enforcement officials, to distinguish genuine 
from counterfeit this is because the counterfeits often look glossier and more genuine than the 
genuine product.189 
 
Counterfeiting is increasingly emerging as predominantly cross-jurisdictional. However, there 
is an absence of competent regional and sub-regional judicial tribunals to deal with such cross-
jurisdictional issues where they emerge. These necessarily means that the enforcement 
agencies would not have the benefit of such fora to adjudicate over such concerns whenever 
they arise. A solution might be to effect amendments on the jurisdiction of the ARIPO Tribunal 
(and OAPI High Commission for Appeals) to confer jurisdiction on cross-jurisdiction 
counterfeiting. Alternatively, bilateral treaty amongst different countries may allow and confer 
jurisdiction as appropriate.  
 
Still on the challenge in capacity, the ACA Executive Director now has authority to ostensibly 
record confessions and punish suspected counterfeiters. The Act despite creating this power 
does not make provision for the procedure to be adopted on the recordal of these confessions 
(if at all), and an attendant appellate mechanism. This is in violation of Article 47, Constitution 
of Kenya, and the Fair Administrative Actions Act, both of which impose a very high standard 
for fair administrative action. This is certainly an encumbrance on ACA’s capacity. Susan Sell 
cautions that conferring such broad powers, on enforcement agencies without training on 
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handling or resolving complex legal disputations on alleged infringement cases will actually 
cause collapse of ‘suspects’ who after all end up being innocent.190 
 
3.3.3 Proliferation of counterfeit pharma in the online market place 
 
Lastly, the effective enforcement against the illicit counterfeit trade faces an all too familiar 
challenge accruing from the emergence of technology and increased penetration and 
proliferation of internet and e-commerce. Kenya continues to witness a steady exponential 
growth of internet access, across the length and breadth of the country. The Communications 
Authority of Kenya (CA), in its Third Quarter Sector Statistics Report for the Financial Year 
2017/2018 notes that, “(Kenya’s) total data/Internet subscriptions grew (from the last review) 
by 8.2 percent, to record 36.1 million subscriptions (up) from 33.3 million recorded during the 
second quarter of the same financial year.”191 The report further highlights the total internet 
subscriptions as standing at 36.1 million subscriptions as at March 2018, growing from the 
previous 25.7 million in March 2017. The CA attributes the growth in internet subscription to 
the proliferation of smart phones used to access social media sites192 and possibly e-commerce 
platforms.  
 
As this author has urged separately in a blogpost published by CIPIT, “the growth in internet 
access and digital communication technologies, has expanded the vulnerability to increased 
infringement of IPRs through pirated-copyright works193 and counterfeited products. The 
nature of internet and digital communication technologies therefore not only increases by the 
volumes, the number of potential counterfeiters, but it also heightens the exposure to possible 
infringement over the internet. The ease of modification and replication, coupled by access, 
reach; evinces the vulnerability and brings into focus the legal environment available for 
asserting and protecting IPRs in this space. Consequently, from an enforcement perspective, 
the IPR owners are more vulnerable in a social-media internet era.”194 Due to the relative 
anonymity in e-commerce legit traders and counterfeiters are becoming synonymous, making 
it difficult to tell the two apart. Counterfeiters are able to anonymously market and sell their 
illicit wares online and delete any evidence immediately payment is received.195 
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A number of small and medium sized pharma business have taken advantage of the sizeable 
online marketplace.196 Not only is there an upsurge in pharma-boutique e-commerce platforms 
other than the start-ups, a number of established pharmacies have also established online 
stores,197 this in addition to the ‘general’ e-commerce platforms that avail pharma products 
(and potentially counterfeit pharma products) as part of their product offerings.198  
 
This author further urged in the blogpost that, “the online market space enhances ease of access 
but with little opportunity for verification of the authenticity of the products being traded in the 
online market place. The buyers would favor the convenience especially for the sale of goods, 
but most aren’t allowed an opportunity to ascertain the ‘authenticity’ or otherwise of the 
products being traded in the platforms. The bigger enterprises199 have equally sought to align 
their marketing strategies and distribution to leverage on the online sphere.”200 
 
The Kenyan law does not appear responsive to the emergent challenges from the new 
technologies and the e-commerce market. As urged in my published blogpost, “the current 
legal regime is not adequately framed to address piracy and counterfeiting in the online market 
place, and much like established e-commerce platforms the options remain limited to self-help 
strategies adopted including authentication services, and, accreditation and registration of 
merchants.”201 
Earlier this year, the Court of justice of the European Union declined an invitation to hold 
online marketplaces directly liable for trade mark infringement on their platforms.202 The court 
in acknowledging that online marketplaces are frequently used for the sale of counterfeit goods 
however, held that these platforms remain ‘intermediaries’ in the sense that they do not 
participate in the sale and purchase transaction. 
Gommers, C.  and Eva De Pauw, in their article203 highlight the inefficacies of the ‘traditional 
enforcement’ measures to curb the sale of counterfeits (generally) in the online marketplace. 
They address their study on the role played by online marketplace operators in the illicit 
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counterfeit trade. They urge that in applying the principles in the, E-Commerce Directive204 
and the IP Enforcement Directive:205 ultimately holding the operators liable (in as far as they 
derive a discernible economic benefit from the online trade) for infringing products sold 
through their platforms, will ultimately enhance effective curbing of counterfeit trade. Kenya’s 
pharma industry can equally benefit through establishing, “an equitable balance between the 
interests of online marketplace operators and the interests of trade mark owners (could be) 
found by imposing higher monitoring duties on online marketplace operators assuming an 
‘active’ role.”206 The proposal by Gommers and Pauw is an extrapolation of the principles used 
to hold Internet Service Providers (ISPs) liable for copyright infringement, should they run 
afoul the exemption under the ‘safe habor principles.’ The Kenya Copyright Act (as amended 
in 2019) makes provision for ISP liability but only as far as copyright is concerned, a 
contemporaneous amendment in the Kenya Information and Communication Act might be 
necessary to incorporate the proposal: absent which no sui generis law effectively addresses 
the peculiarities brought about by infringement in the online marketplace. 
 
Ultimately however, in concurring with Amor Toumi, this study notes that fundamentally, IP 
solely cannot curb counterfeit pharma. Counterfeit medicine is first and foremost a problem of 
public health, and must be considered as such. So that much as the concerns on Intellectual 
property infringement subsist, but they are secondary to the problems of public health. This 
exposition is not to suggest that IPR enforcement needs to be regarded any less, simply that the 
enforcement measures mustn’t negate public health concerns. From the foregoing, the author 
agrees with Amor Toumi that enforcement of pharma intellectual property rights cannot - done 
in isolation - apprehend the magnitude and the specificities of the issues raised by counterfeit 
pharma which has become a global health scourge causing the death of millions of people207 
and thus the war on pharma counterfeiting requires a wholesome approach.  
 
 3.4 International Best Practise: A Comparative Study 
 
The comparative study discourse herein, focuses on the measures adopted in the Republic of 
South Africa and in the United states of America, as against the three (3) core challenges 
highlighted above as substantively impacting the enforcement against counterfeit pharma in 
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Kenya i.e. scoping of counterfeits, the capacity and lastly the initiatives adopted to curb 
counterfeiting in the online marketplace.  
 
This study settled on these two jurisdictions as they have fairly robust pharmaceutical 
industries, but also a fairly successful enforcement regime. Invariably there are tacit nuances 
in these countries that may occasion a difference in the level of successes even with the 
adoption of their measures within the scope of these study’s focus: this paper however exposes 
the inefficacies of the Kenyan regime as a result of the differences in the approach between 
these countries and Kenya on addressing these challenges highlighting lessons to be learnt by 
Kenya. 
 
  3.4.1 Analysis of the anti-counterfeiting regime in the Republic  
   South Africa  
 
The Republic of South Africa (RSA) admittedly has a fairly advanced and large economy, its 
pharmaceutical sector is valued at an impressive average of between R42.6bn and R45bn as at 
2016. Current estimates put the valuation of the sector at about R50bn as at 2019 
manufacturers’ exit price and R68bn using retail sales.208 It is reported that the Department of 
Health and the Medical Controls Council (the RSA state organ mandated to license 
pharmaceutical companies) had licensed about 276 companies as at 2016.209 Notoriously the 
RSA, has had a challenge of availing adequate medical care to respond to high HIV infections; 
such that how it has availed access to right to health, with a correspondingly robust pharma-
industry under a sui generis anti-counterfeiting law will offer useful comparison for Kenya 
against the three (3) core challenges which is focus in this study. 
 
The anti-counterfeiting legal regime in the RSA is anchored on the Counterfeit Goods Act, 
1997. The Kenyan Anti-Counterfeit Act substantively mirrors (and was indeed modelled) on 
the RSA’s Counterfeit Goods Act, 1997. This RSA legislation was subsequently amended in 
2001 by the Counterfeit Goods Amendment Act, 2001.  
 
On the first challenge on scoping, the Counterfeit Goods Act, 1997 (the RSA’s original 
legislation) defined counterfeiting, and consequently the scope of application of anti-
                                                          








counterfeiting measures to only intellectual property rights registered in the RSA.210 Further 
however, the Act extends clarity on the import of the scope of what is capable of being 
counterfeit(ed) and thus subject to the mandate and jurisdiction of the Act as a protected good 
for which intellectual property right obtains; by defining intellectual property rights (for 
purposes of the Act) within a limited scope to only Trademarks and Copyrights.211  
 
Such definition adopted by the RSA excludes all other IPRs including the patents, Plant 
Varieties inter alia from within the scope of the anti-counterfeiting law. The consequent effect 
is to alleviate the challenge that would be otherwise posed by the technical nature of some of 
these IPRs, necessarily limiting the anti-counterfeit enforcers’ ability to effectively discharge 
their mandate. 
 
In terms of scoping therefore the RSA anti-counterfeiting regime aptly limits the scope to the 
IPRs registered and/or recognized in RSA. Secondly it limits its scope to only trademarks and 
counterfeits. However, no particular or specific mention/definition is made of medicine or 
pharma products in the Counterfeit Goods Act. The Act opts to address itself solely to the IPR.  
 
Secondly this study has highlighted one of the core challenges posed on efficacy of anti-
counterfeit enforcement in Kenya as being the capacity of the enforcement officials. The RSA’s 
Counterfeit Goods Act establishes the offices of inspectors, where any apprehensive owner of 
an IPR (being either copyright or trademark owner) may lodge a complaint with any inspector. 
 
Of significance to this study however, is that the RSA Act allows under Section 1(x) as read 
with Section 15(9) thereof for the appointment of other officers, and/or confers additional 
officers with the authority and mandate of an inspector under the Act. These include any police 
officers under the Criminal Procedure Act212 of the rank of sergeant and above, and the 
Commissioner of customs as well as officers of the South African Revenue Service’s Customs 
and Excise Department. The significantly helps complement the human resource numbers 
available to undertake enforcement of IPRs. 
 
Further the Counterfeit Goods Act, 1997 strictly provides that an inspector may only enter, 
inspect seize and or otherwise impound/detain or interfere with suspected counterfeit goods on 
the strength of a warrant. This notwithstanding if any action by an inspector is not subsequently 
confirmed by a court within ten (10) days thereof, then such act stands voided and any seized 
goods returned to the ‘suspect’. Indeed, this ensures effective judicial oversight over the 
                                                          
210 Section 1(1)(iv), Counterfeit Goods Act, 1997 (of South Africa).  
211 Section 1(1)(xi), Counterfeit Goods Act, 1997 (of South Africa). 
212 Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (of South Africa) 
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discharge of the broad (almost draconian) powers vested on the inspectors to enter private 
premises and seize without prior notice or warning. 
 
Lastly, on the challenge of online infringement, the RSA Counterfeit Goods Act, proscribes 
putting up for for sale, hiring out, barter, exchange; or, exposing for sale, for barter or for 
exchange; exhibition in public for purposes of trade; distribution for purposes of trade, or for 
any other purposes to such an extent that the owner of an IPR in respect of any particular 
protected goods suffers prejudice; imports into, through or export from; or in any other manner 
dispose of in the course of trade.213  
 
This provision effectively avails itself to facilitating assumption of jurisdiction over 
infringement in the online market place. The online market place avails itself to offer for sale 
and/or distribute (possibly) counterfeit goods, and the very nature of the online market place 
(afore-discussed) challenges the traditional mechanisms hitherto established for purposes of 
combating illicit trade in counterfeit pharma. To the extent that the RSA law proscribes the key 
attributes of the illicit trade online then it seeks to address counterfeit within the e-commerce 
sphere. But certainly, a more direct address of the concern is preferable. 
 
  3.4.2 Analysis of the Anti-Counterfeit Regime in the United States of America 
   
As a preliminary the US Department of Commerce notes that pricing of Pharma products is 
designed to ensure that the investment towards past and future Research and Development 
Costs are recouped. It further notes that the industry is heavily dependent on development of 
new molecules to replace the revenue streams of older drugs that are nearing the expiration of 
their patent terms.214 Quite clearly guaranteeing the ability to secure return on investment made 
in the R&D would necessarily mitigate the overall cost of the drugs. This USDC/ITA report 
urges for adoption of measures that would enhance R&D in the sector but also not unduly curb 
growth of ‘new medicine’ – generics. So how exactly does the US market address this concern?  
 
The US anti-counterfeiting regime is enforced under the Trademark Counterfeiting Act, 
1984215 which equally relies on the preceding registration of a trademark as such under the 
Lanham Act.216 In an article by Brian J. Kearney, he observes that the United States of America 
(US) anti-counterfeit law has a long troubled past with the US Congress’s hitherto unsuccessful 
                                                          
213Section 2(1)(a),(c),(d),(e)&(f), Counterfeit Goods Act, (of South Africa).  
214US Department of Commerce, International Trade Association, 2016 Top Markets Report Pharmaceuticals, 
https://www.trade.gov/topmarkets/pdf/Pharmaceuticals_Top_Markets_Reports.pdf    
215 US Title Code 18, Section 2320 Trafficking in Counterfeit Goods and Service (of the United States of America) 
216 US Title Code 15, Section 1051 Trademarks Act (of the United States of America). 
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attempts to impose criminal sanctions for commercial violation of trademarks,217 with the US 
Supreme Court striking out previous attempts for want of constitutional authority, ultimately 
leading to the enactment of the Trademark Counterfeiting Act in 1994. This enactment had 
been constrained by three key factors, first deficiencies in the Lanham Act to deter through 
sanctions - commercial counterfeiters; increase in demand for counterfeits as a result of growth 
in mass advertising (consumer accomplices discussed above); and, advances in technology that 
made it easier to counterfeit.218 This article also importantly highlights these contestations 
made with regard to the definition and/or scoping of counterfeiting under the Acts, enforcement 
capacity and online marketplace infringement; as challenges currently afflicting the efficacy of 
Kenya’s anti-counterfeit regime. 
 
In seeking to adequately deter counterfeiting, the Trademark Counterfeiting Act created 
‘tripled-graduated’ fines of not more than USD 2 Million or USD 5 Million for first time 
offenders (for individuals and corporates respectively) and not more than USD 5 Million or 
USD 15 for second and subsequent offender: and/or longer custodial sentences of not more 
than 10 or 20 years for first time and repeat offenders respectively.219 This is addressed in the 
Kenyan law. However, for counterfeit pharma, the Act created higher fines of not more than 
USD 5 Million or USD 15 Million for first time offenders (for individuals and corporates 
respectively) and not more than USD 15 Million or USD 35 for second and subsequent 
offender: and/or longer custodial sentences of not more than 20 or 30 years for first time and 
repeat offenders respectively.220 So that distinct from the approach in RSA there is special 
consideration for counterfeit-pharma in the primary anti-counterfeiting regime. The Trademark 
Counterfeiting Act also capacitated enforcement officers through introduction of (ex parte) 
seizure raids221 including allowing for forfeiture, destruction and restitution222 as an additional 
measure to effectively deter counterfeiters.  
 
The Trademark Counterfeiting Act, particularly defines the scope of counterfeit as seemingly 
limited to trademarks, and further only those registered in the US under the Lanham Act. This 
scoping approach is similar to that adopted by the RSA. Particularly para a(4) of the Lanham 
Act, the US law proscribes unauthorized use of marks and/or counterfeit marks on drugs. It 
                                                          
217 Kearney JB, The Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984: a Sensible Legislative Response to the Ills of 
Commercial Counterfeiting, 1986, Fordham Urban Law Journal, Fordham University School of Law Vol 14(1). 
218 Kearney JB, The Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, 132. 
219 (b)1(A)&(B), US Title Code 18, Section 2320 Trafficking in Counterfeit Goods and Service (of the United States 
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220 (b)3(A)&(B), US Title Code 18, Section 2320 Trafficking in Counterfeit Goods and Service (of the United States 
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defines a drug against which an anti-counterfeit action may be brought in the US as, “a drug, 
as defined in section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 321). 
(g)Nothing in this section shall entitle the United States to bring a criminal cause of action 
under this section for the repackaging of genuine goods or services not intended to deceive or 
confuse.”223 In further scoping, the US regime creates a prerequisite element of mens rea (viz 
presence intent to deceive or confuse) by requiring establishment of ‘knowingly and 
intentionally’ in ascribing criminal culpability for the counterfeiting offences.  
 
But additionally at Para H the US Attorney General is required to report on the efforts 
undertaken by the Department of Justice, in enforcing against criminal infringement of 
copyright, by inference recognizing the jurisdiction to curb copyright piracy additionally under 
this Act.224 So that the regime appears to additionally create an oversight by the legislature on 
the enforcement measures against counterfeiting and piracy. 
 
Of additional note, the U.S. Congress enacted the Drug Supply Chain Security Act (DSCSA) 
in 2013, in a bid to address the emerging challenge of online infringement. The Act requires 
the pharmaceutical industry to adopt, by 2023, an “interoperable system” which will allow easy 
tracing of prescription drugs as they are distributed in the U.S.225 The blockchain idea advanced 
by the DSCSA is simply “a ledger software that creates a tamper-proof, indelible record of 
transactions. This record of transactions is decentralized, every participant maintains a copy of 
the ledger and needs to approve any change. Additionally, the system is fully transparent, the 
list of transactions is visible to everyone.”226 The DSCSA developed measures that will 
additionally effectively aid curb the counterfeit menace solved with time. In doing so, the Act 
proposed; 
“.. 
(a) Require more information about drug transactions. Starting Jan. 1, 2015, companies in 
the pharmaceutical supply chain—manufacturers, repackagers, wholesalers, and 
pharmacies—must share specific data, including the lot number, with all trading 
partners for each transaction and other changes of ownership. In most cases, the data 
must document the full purchase and sale history of all drugs in a shipment back to the 
original manufacturer. This will dissuade illegal activity, such as purchasing counterfeit 
medicine from an unauthorized foreign supplier, by making the origin and routing of 
                                                          
223(f)(6), US Title Code 18, Section 2320 Trafficking in Counterfeit Goods and Service (of the United States of 
America). 
224(h), US Title Code 18, Section 2320 Trafficking in Counterfeit Goods and Service (of the United States of 
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225Michelle, ‘Can Blockchain help solve the Problem of Counterfeit Drugs?’ Digital Initiative < 
https://rctom.hbs.org/submission/can-blockchain-help-solve-the-problem-of-counterfeit-drugs/> on 27 April 
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226 Michelle, ‘Can Blockchain help solve the Problem of Counterfeit Drugs?’. 
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the drugs more transparent. With regular checking of transaction histories, criminals 
will be deterred from introducing unsafe or compromised medicines of unknown origin 
into consumer markets.  
(b) Require unique serial numbers on each package of drug. By the end of 2017, nearly 
every individual package will carry a unique barcode. This will eventually allow 
companies along the entire supply chain to verify the authenticity of the drugs they 
acquire, making it more difficult for criminals to introduce counterfeit drugs into the 
pharmaceutical supply. Drug packages with fake serial numbers or with packaging that 
has been inappropriately altered will be easier to identify and remove from circulation. 
(c) Enhance licensure standards. The law creates a transparent system for pharmaceutical 
wholesale distributors that establishes minimum standards for licensure in the United 
States and also requires them to report their licensing status and contact information to 
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The information will be publicly 
available through online databases, which will help supply chain stakeholders, 
including health care providers, avoid purchasing from unlicensed suppliers.  
(d) Build an interoperable, electronic system. The law requires manufacturers, wholesalers, 
and pharmacies to use serial numbers and an electronic system by 2023, which captures 
and shares information in order to trace each package of medicine. The FDA and 
stakeholders will work together to determine how this system will work and how data 
will be exchanged. The unique serial numbers will allow any pharmacy or wholesaler 



















4.0 Chapter Four: Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
4.1 Findings and Conclusions 
 
First, Article 41, TRIPS Agreement obligates Kenya to ensure that the measures and actions 
adopted to protect IPRs are effective. TRIPS also provides minimum obligations and Kenya in 
designing effective actions must be minded not to use the TRIPS as a floor but possibly a 
ceiling to balance the possible deleterious monopolistic effects of securing IPRs. Indeed, as 
under TRIPs IP infringement generally is not equated conceptually to counterfeiting. As a key 
observation, this study has established that indeed the apt protection and enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights, is integral in the advancement of economic development, and 
more particularly growth of the pharma-industry. Contemporaneously, the study has equally 
established that apt intellectual property rights enforcement is essential in facilitating the 
realisation of the right to health. It is therefore critical, that for this synchronised but almost 
competing interests to be realised, that the responsiveness of the regime established to inter alia 
enforce intellectual property rights.   
 
The right to health is a global undertaking as expressed in various international treaties 
principally the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),227 Article 12 of the 
International Covenant of Socio-Economic Rights (ICESR)228 and Article 12 of the Convention 
on All forms of Discrimination against Women. Equally, regionally the Right to Healthcare is 
also recognised under the African Charter of Human and Peoples Rights229 under Article 16 
thereto. Sustainable Development Goal 3 of the Millennium Development Goals also compels 
states to ensure the wellbeing for all at all ages. The preceding demonstrates the global 
significance attaching to the right to health, and in actualizing these globally covenanted 
standards this study argues apt enforcement of IPRs is peremptory.  
 
Separately against this global premise, it is important to note that no country is immune to 
counterfeiting in pharmaceutical products.230 However, the frequency and effects of the said 
counterfeiting of pharma is higher in countries with comparatively low incomes particularly in 
Africa and Asia.231 An inefficacious enforcement for IPRs in the pharma-industry has seen a 
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flourishing illicit business of production and sale of counterfeit drugs. As afore-urged, Kenya 
is one of the countries with an ineffective anti-counterfeiting regime. The challenge from 
counterfeit-pharma is global and various measures continue to be adopted in an attempt to 
weed-out counterfeit drugs.  
 
It is against this premises that this study considers available measures for enhancing Kenya’s 
IPR enforcement regime with regard to anti-counterfeiting through considering measures 
adopted by different stakeholders in the pharma industry, both internationally and regionally, 
in an effort to curb this pharma-counterfeit.     
 
In enhancing the enforcement regime, Shrivastava, Shrivastava, and Ramasamy propose 7 
defined parameters for consideration and adoption by governments in a bid to combat the 
menace of counterfeit medicine; 
 “…  
(a) First and foremost, requirement is to have an exact estimate of the nature and 
extent of the counterfeit drugs problem in the country so that scarcely 
distributed resources can be utilized to the optimal extent,  
(b) The policy makers should formulate a comprehensive policy to address all the 
potential threats in the field of counterfeit medicine market, 
(c) Subsequently, strategy should be to actively involve all stakeholders namely 
health authorities, drug regulatory authorities, wholesalers, retailers, police, 
customs, judiciary, pharmaceutical industry and patients. Creating awareness 
among the population regarding generic drugs and the dangers of the illicit 
medicines with the help of appropriate mass media aids is of paramount 
importance, 
(d) Designing appropriate laws with the help of legal department and facilitating 
their strict enforcement; providing legal assistance to the consumers; and 
employment of strict pharmacovigilance mechanisms, 
(e) Organizing training sessions for the benefit of pharmacists and health care 
professionals in different aspects of counterfeiting,  
(f) Building of a network to strengthen collaborative activities at local, district, 
regional, national and international levels; and ensuring continuous monitoring 
and evaluation of implemented measures,  
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(g) Adoption of newer technologies like use of cost-effective electrophoresis 
devices/more sophisticated devices for warranting quality assurance of 
drugs.”232 
 
In evaluating the efficacy of Kenya’s regime enacted to curb pharma counterfeiting this study, 
reference is made to the above recommendations, as against the lenses of the three (3) core 
challenges the focus of this study first, scoping of protection; secondly capacity of the 
enforcement agency; and lastly, prevalence of counterfeit pharma in the online market place. 
Being minded to particularize the solutions to Kenya, as ‘localized’ solutions have in many 




In deed this study has evinced the gravity of the counterfeiting menace globally and particularly 
in Kenya. It has further particularised this concern within the pharma-industry. Additionally, 
this study also considered what appears to be effective measures adopted by the United States 
of America and the Republic of South Africa, as against the regime adopted in Kenya vis-à-vis 
her obligations under TRIPS. However, as discussed in the preceding chapter any strategy 
adopted may be remiss on account of absence of accurate data on the exact scope and quantum 
of pharma counterfeiting amounts.234 In Kenya, one of the biggest challenges has been that 
pharma-companies do not report infringement of their patents and trademarks in the 
pharmaceutical industry.235 
 
As afore-urged by various epistemological thoughts, without a threshold in research, IP 
protection would be unsustainable but equally without IP protection research would be 
unviable. The USDC/ITA significantly highlights that in 2016 the pharma-industry invested a 
whopping 34 Billion Euros in R&D and that ostensibly, “geographical balance of the 
pharmaceutical market – and ultimately the R&D base – is likely to shift gradually towards 
emerging economies.”236 Having considered the direct benefits of a robust IPR enforcement 
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regime and incentives for growth; it then behoves Kenya to develop her IP enforcement regime 
and lay premise for exponential growth of its pharmaceutical industry. 
 
This study’s raison d’etre is leveraging of adequate protection of IPRs within the 
pharmaceutical industry as a means of facilitating achievement of the development including 
under the Big Four Agenda: Hence the isolation of the three (3) core challenges of Kenya’s 
anti-counterfeiting enforcement for critique within the context of the utility of (criminal) IPR 
enforcement. The Principal Secretary in the Ministry of Trade noted during the launch of the 
IP enforcement working group, that the protection and enforcement of IPRs was indeed a key 
incentive towards the promotion of the manufacturing sector.237  
 
Further, with the emergence and growth of e-commerce, the pharmaceutical industry has not 
been left behind with the introduction of pharmaceutical applications on mobile devices as well 
as websites. This ‘new market frontiers’ while demonstrative of the opportunities created by 
innovation it equally exposes a higher degree in vulnerability in the counterfeit pharma-sector. 
Counterfeiters now have at their disposal sophisticated distribution networks,238 breaching 
national barriers and according anonymity with the attendant enforcement nightmare.239 
Business and the legal regime must adapt to this new threat. So what recommendations are 
available to enhance the efficacy of the anti-counterfeit regime in Kenya: 
 
First, scoping the government must objectively review its policy approach, that appears to 
overzealously adopt an expansionist stance in the anti-counterfeit legislation.240 This would be 
to ensure that pharma-IPRs are protected without unduly barring trade in the country and 
defeating realization of the Big Four Agenda.  
 
In redefining its approach regard must be heard to the global IPR regime, to wit Kenya is a 
signatory. More specifically, the TRIPS Agreement sets out the minimum standards of 
protection in relation to IPRs including in effecting anti-counterfeiting legislation. Kenya’s 
regime currently so broadly defines241 the scope of counterfeits without any established value, 
unnecessarily distracting enforcement measures. This expanded scope has been declared 
                                                          
237Inter-Agency Anti-Illicit Working Group Launched in Nairobi to Fight Trade in Counterfeits < 
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unconstitutional before by the High Court of Kenya242 and infact the National Assembly 
subsequently appropriately amended the impugned section.243 Ergo, it is incredulous that the 
Kenyan Parliament reintroduced the unconstitutionally broadened scope of counterfeiting 
under Statute Law (Miscellaneous Amendment) No 18 of 2018, despite the Court’s 
observations on the impact of the scoping on realization for the right to health. 
 
As considered from the USA and RSA, the scope ideally ought to restrict itself to IPRs in the 
nature of trademarks and copyright of the one part; and, trademarks and copyrights that are 
registered and recognized in Kenya of the other. For purposes of this study, scope on pharma 
ought to be limited accordingly to pharma-trademarks registered in Kenya. The anti-counterfeit 
enforcement team would be better placed to effectively enforce a better particularized 
proscription, leaving pharmacovigilance and quality/standard verification to better equipped 
agencies such as the PPB and KEBS, allowing efficacy in the process. 
 
Secondly, on capacity Kenya’s regime includes any police officer, officers deputed to 
administer any IPR under any of the IPR registration or administration regimes; as an ACA 
inspector.244 A distinction is drawn from the RSA approach that even in designating police 
officers a minimum rank (supposing a minimum level of training and experience); presumably 
on account of the broad powers conferred on anti-counterfeit enforcement officers.  
 
It is also important to recognize that arguably, the biggest ill in Kenya which is the vice of 
corruption. This is because corruption cuts across all sectors and is thus a direct contributor to 
pharma counterfeiting in instance when bribes are taken to compromise enforcement measures, 
this cripples the fight against counterfeit pharma-goods.  
 
Separately on lessons from RSA, the law imposes a mandatory requirement for warrants before 
action by ACA inspectors, but even more importantly the RSA law defines a mandatory 10 day 
period within which the inspector must present the matter before court, failing which the 
actions under the warrant are voided. In Kenya the inspectors enjoy a period of ninety days,245 
before presenting such matter before court – to insert the necessary impetus on the fight 
implementation of the ACA’s mandate, this period ought to be reviewed as against the RSA 
provisions.  
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Another concern on the 2nd parameter, is the provision under the Section 34A, Anti-counterfeit 
Act246 recordal of confessions by the ACA Executive Director from suspected counterfeiters. 
Subsequent thereto the ACA Executive Director has authority to issue penalties in the nature 
of fines and orders of destruction of seized property. Fundamental legal concerns arise form 
this provision, first the Act dose not provide for an appellate mechanism, from the Executive 
Director’s decision and penalty meted out, and that supposedly his decisions therein are final 
and may be enforced as a decree of the High Court. Secondly, despite being quasi-judicial 
proceedings there is no procedure or regulations on the recording of these confessions, 
exposing the suspect to possible coercion or undue influence with limited opportunity to 
challenge.  
 
Additionally, the Act247 creates the intellectual Property Enforcement and Co-ordination 
Advisory Committee IPECAC) but other than the apparent advisory role discernible from its 
title, the law fails to ascribe any distinct official roles. The law details that IPECAC comprises 
membership the Principal Secretary form the Ministry responsible for trade and 14 agencies 
involved in enforcement of IPRs. These 14 agencies are also not particularized under the law. 
From the examination of the Kenyan IPR legal regime, the need for coordination of multiple 
state agencies is apparent. However, the law therein does not provide for the formal 
engagement of specific agencies and this compromises the fight against counterfeit- pharma. 
 
Thirdly, it is this paper’s recommendation that in enhancing the efficacy of the anti-
counterfeiting regime regard must equally be had to online environment. Indeed the difficulty 
in regulating this space cannot be gainsaid.248 There is a growth in the uptake of internet usage 
and more particularly e-commerce in Kenya. Infact, the Communications Authority of Kenya 
is enjoined by law to facilitate the development of electronic commerce including through 
minimizing instances of fraud and barriers to the growth of this sector.249  There is need 
therefore for this regime to specifically address the specificities that are associated with 
counterfeiting in the online market place.  
 
As afore-urged Kenyans increasingly have wider access to the internet including through 
availed pharma-specific online platforms. This necessitates the need to ensure that authorities 
such as PBB have an online portal such as WHO Essential Medicines and Health Products 
                                                          
246 Section 34A, Anti-Counterfeit Act, 2008 (as amended in 2014). 
247Section 16(4), Anti-Counterfeit Act, (as amended by Act 18 of 2014). 
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Information Portal supports efforts to improve access to essential medicines and health 
products by making related, full-text articles available online.250 
 
Further apt enforcement of IPRs at the online market place essentially invites the 
pharmaceutical companies in the fight against pharma counterfeiting. Indeed, these companies 
are called-upon to adopt self-help strategies251 and mechanisms alongside the e-commerce 
platforms, to ensure they minimize as far as possible the offering for sale of counterfeit pharma 
online. These strategies would address detection, prevention and response mechanisms, and 
the strategies cannot be limited to legal but center on technological measures. The pharma 
companies must nonetheless be minded of the Streisand effect252, where in curbing the online 
counterfeit pharma; the potential unexpected effect of negative feedback from clients 
 
The nuances of the online market place calls for enforcement of IPRs minded of the need to 
balance between consumer protection, asserting IPRs and facilitating trade. The growth of the 
online market place is certainly integral in facilitating international trade; however, it is 
necessary to adopt regulatory measures that do not bar trade but also do not compromise the 
legitimate interests including consumers’ safety as well as the rights of IPR holders. 
 
In linking the online enforcement measures to awareness creation (as significant strategy in 
curbing counterfeits), some companies urge that consumers in most instances aren’t even aware 
that they are buying fake products; and seek to incentivize the consumers to purchase genuine 
by offering add-ons to their products.253 But equally targeted at the consumers must be 
measures to ensure that the genuine pharma is affordable and readily available; this will help 
address the challenge posed by consumer accomplices. 
 
The importance of this awareness creation and measures at addressing availability and access, 
is pertinent because consumers ultimately play a leading role in maintaining of counterfeit 
trade. It is therefore important to gain a deeper insight in the potential motives of consumers’ 
willingness to purchase counterfeit products.  
 
In summing up the above recommendations there is an underlying challenge on availability of 
requisite funding. A common hurdle in enforcement is always the issue of insufficient funding. 
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The enforcement of IPRs with regards of pharma counterfeiting is certainly an expensive affair, 
the ACA was recently upgraded as a state Authority from an Agency, now referred to as the 
Anti-Counterfeit Authority from the hitherto Anti-Counterfeit agency254 - seemingly innocuous 
- this change is significant in the ability of the now Authority to receive a higher budgetary 
allocation rom government, and authorization to recruit a higher number of technical staff.   
 
It would be fallacious however for this study to propound that an apt address of these 3 core 
challenges would, in and of themselves solely redress the challenges faced by the Kenyan 
pharma industry. It is this study’s considered contention that there are numerous other enablers 
necessary to optimise the potential of this industry, however an apt anti-counterfeiting regime 
is at the heart of any such responsive measures. 
 
In conclusion, this research confirms that indeed there exists an Intellectual Property Regime 
in Kenya but the regime has not been as efficient as could be in the enforcement of IPRs in 
respect of pharmaceutical products. The recommendations above-made establish that it is 
indeed possible to enhance the efficacy of enforcement against IPRs through a review of the 
legal regime and ultimately wholesomely positively impact the fight on pharma counterfeiting 
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